Essays in Macroeconomics by Dalkiran, Dilsat Tugba (Author) et al.
Essays in Macroeconomics
by
Dilsat Tugba Dalkiran
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Approved June 2018 by the
Graduate Supervisory Committee:
Kevin Reffett, Chair
Manjira Datta
Galina Vereshchagina
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
August 2018
ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of two parts. The first part is about understanding the
mechanism behind female labor supply movement over economic development. Fe-
male labor force participation follows a U-shape pattern over per capita GDP cross
nationally as well as within some countries. This paper questions if this pattern can
be explained through sectoral, uneven technological movements both at market and
at home. For that I develop a general equilibrium model with married couples and
home production. I defined multiple sectors both at home and in the market. And
by feeding the model with uneven technological growth, I observe how participation
rate moves over development. My results indicate that a decrease in labor supply
is mainly due to structural transformation. Meaning, a higher technology in a large
sector causes prices to go up in that sector relative to other. Hence, labor allocated
to this sector will decrease. Assuming this sector has a big market share, it will
decrease the labor supply. Also, I found that the increase in female labor supply is
mostly because of movement from home to market as a result of a higher technolog-
ical growth in the market. The second part is about developing a methodology to
verify and compute the existence of recursive equilibrium in dynamic economies with
capital accumulation and elastic labor supply. The method I develop stems from the
multi-step monotone mapping methodology which is based on monotone operators
and solving a fixed point problem at each step. The methodology is not only useful
for verifying and computing the recursive competitive equilibrium, but also useful for
obtaining intra- and inter-temporal comparative dynamics. I provide robust intra-
temporal comparative statics about how consumption and leisure decisions change in
response to changes in capital stock and inverse marginal utility of consumption. I
also provide inter-temporal equilibrium comparative dynamics about how recursive
equilibrium consumption and investment respond to changes in discount factor and
i
production externality. Different from intra-temporal comparative statics, these are
not robust as they only apply to a subclass of equilibrium where investment level is
monotone.
ii
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Chapter 1
LITERATURE REVIEW AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON FEMALE LABOR
SUPPLY
1.1 Introduction
The relationship between economic growth and female labor supply has been one
of the fundamental questions in economics literature. As there is not a one sided
causality between these two factors, we see the studies on this relationship have been
divided into two.
A great deal of literature has been invested upon how female labor supply affects
the economic growth both theoretically and empirically. Theoretical studies focus on
developing a new model to explain the affects of female labor supply on economic
growth as the exogenous growth model could not capture the structural changes in
labor force. In an exogenous growth model with production, the factors of production
are capital and labor. In these models, labor is an exogenous variable which is mea-
sured by the population size and the population size does not change drastically over
time. Hence, capital accumulation is the only source of growth in most exogenous
models such as Solow (1956). After the introduction of endogenous growth models, we
have been introduced to human capital which is an endogenous variable and captures
several other intangible assets of individuals such as knowledge, experience, education
level, health status etc. With this third input factor, economists could explain how
education, for instance, can increase the economic growth even the population size
does not change (Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995)). This major step in theoretical
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literature lead to many empirical studies which help economists to understand the
effect of female labor supply on growth.
With the help of endogenous growth models, many empirical studies focus on cer-
tain changes in women’s life such as education or health to understand their chang-
ing labor supply decisions as well as its impact on economic growth. In this sense;
Knowles, Lorgelly and Owen develop a neoclassical growth model with gender specific
education in production technology. Their theoretical and empirical findings states
the educational gender gap creates an obstacle in economic growth and increasing
female education promotes labor productivity (Knowles et al. (2002)). Dollar and
Gatti (1999) confirm the similar findings in developing countries. Low investments
on women’s education and health is a bad choice for economic growth. Moreover,
Guner et al. (2011) show how individual taxation raises the lfp of married women.
Klasen (2000), Klasen (2003) and Klasen and Lamanna (2009) are some of other em-
pirical studies about this strand of literature. Hence, the positive effects of higher
female labor supply on economic growth have been largely studied.
On the other hand, there are also some studies which claim that gender inequal-
ity contributes to the economic development of a country. In his study on semi-
industrialized export-oriented countries, Seguino finds that GDP growth and gender
wage inequality has a positive relationship. The reason behind this controversial re-
sult is that in these countries, employers are faced with international competition
so they have limited bargaining power on their wages. As the majority of work-
ers are female, they are paid little for their productivity. Seguino (2000) claims the
sources of growth in these economies are technological imports and investment. Gen-
der inequality stimulates investment hence causes economic growth. Lastly, Barro
and Sala-i Martin (1995) find educating women has a negative effect on economic
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growth. However, their estimations have been criticized a lot due to inadequate con-
sideration of collinearity and endogeneity problems by Dollar and Gatti (1999) and
Knowles et al. (2002). In fact, the main problem in their paper is using GDP growth
rates instead of GDP per capita as dependent varable. As we already know from
Solow (1956), poor countries in general have higher growth rates as opposed to richer
countries. Hence, using GDP growth as the endogenous variable causes them to mis-
interpret their results and they falsely conclude that low female education leads to
higher growth. To sum up, although there are some studies which talk about negative
effects of female labor supply on economic growth, they have been criticized a lot due
to several technical problems. Today, most economists agree that increasing female
labor supply positively affects economic growth of a country. Hence, we see several
papers in economics literature which have been searching for new policies to increase
female labor supply. Health reforms, education, maternity or paternity leaves and
tax reforms are a few of these family-oriented policies which aim to increase labor
supply of women because it will eventually contribute to economic development.
Although the positive impact of labor supply on economic growth has been es-
tablished in economic history, the disagreement about the effects of economic growth
on female labor supply is ongoing. Theoretically, one part of the literature claims
that economic growth will eliminate the discrimination in the economy and any sort
of gender gap will disappear. This line of thought implies economic growth increases
female labor supply. Becker (2010) states that discrimination does not prevail in a
competitive market in the long run as optimal decision making requires agents to take
actions which maximize their profit or utility rather than taking actions according
to their prejudices against one group. This is knows as ”Modernization of Neoclas-
sical Approach”. He also adds that a persistence discrimination against a particular
group can be explained by introducing a preference for discrimination into objective
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function. Hence, in a competitive market, if there is a discrimination, this must be a
preference, market friction, otherwise any discrimination will disappear as explained
above.
Becker’s insights about discrimination leads to several studies about this topic.
Some of these studies concentrate on the harmful effects of discrimination on the
economy whereas the others focus on the policy side of the story. Dollar and Gatti
(1999) suggest that market expansion eliminate all sorts of market imperfections one
of which is women-specific investments. Similarly, Weber (1978) and Durkheim (1964)
note that gender-discriminatory practices prevents a healthy market mechanism. On
the other hand, a vast majority of studies focus on the policy aspect of economic
development and its effects on women. Higher economic development means better
health provision for women. Considering women are most likely to die in childbearing
years than men due to pregnancy and giving birth, Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney
(2009) find that a sudden drop in maternal mortality thanks to an effective public
policy leads to a rise in life expectancy of girls as well as a convergence in the education
level of boys and girls. Hence, these and many other studies support modernization of
neoclassical approach and provide several aspects of this idea. However, as mentioned
above, the positive impact of economic development on female labor supply is not set
in stone.
While the modernization of neoclassical approach assumes a positive effect of
economic development on female labor supply, or women’s empowerment in general
terms, a vast literature claims a convex impact. The idea goes back to Boserup
(1970) who argues that there is a convex relationship between female labor supply
over the course of economic development. Growth initially causes a fall in female
labor supply and then a rise as the economy continues to grow. He explains this
phenomena in three stages: The first stage is observed in low income or developing
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countries which have large agricultural sector. In these economies, most women work
in family farms as agricultural workers and contribute into production apart from
home production. As they work at home, their fertility rate is high. In agricultural
societies, women give many births as the number of children raises the family income
by participating in agricultural production. As households mostly include extended
family members such as grandparents, the small children are taken care of by them.
Hence, women as well as adult children have time to work at the family enterprises.
Many African countries such as Sierra Lione, Kenya can be counted in this stage. In
the second stage, female labor supply starts falling as the country steps into indus-
trialization stage. Reduction of agricultural sector and labor mobility as a result of
mechanization makes it more difficult for women to combine market and house work.
Especially, when it is combined with the required physical strength to use machines
in early industrialization and stigma towards working women outside of their family
enterprises, the demand for female workers decreases. Third stage is when female
labor supply rises in developed countries due mostly to the mechanisms known from
modernization of neoclassical approach. Rise of the service sector and consequently
the rising demand for mental skills rather than motor skills increases the demand for
female workers. Many developed countries such as United States, Britain and France
can be counted in this stage.
1.1.1 U-Shape in Cross Country Data
Figure 1.1 summarizes the relationship between female labor force participation
(LFP, hereafter) and gross domestic product (GDP, hereafter) per capita in 2012. The
data is collected from World Development Indicators. Both female LFP and GDP
per capita are 5-year averages from 1965 to 2012 to be consistent with the previous
literature. Finally, each dot on the figure displays a country. The quadratic fitted
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line displays a clear U-shaped trend over economic development which is statistically
significant. This U-shaped trend persists itself over the decades up until 1970s and it
is always statistically significant.
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Figure 1.1: Female LFP in 2012
Several other empirical studies also proves the existence of U-shaped. Olivetti
(2013) shows the existence of U-shaped labor force participation over 16 selected
developed countries. She developed a panel data set for 16 high-income countries
that contains comparable data on LFP for the population aged 15 and over for the
period 1890 through 2005. These high-income countries includes: Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States. The data is from
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1890 to 2005 and after 1900, it is at 5-year intervals. I replicate this analysis and
confirm that U-shape female LFP is persistent for these countries as well. Figure 1.2
displays the replication results.
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Figure 1.2: Female LFP and Economic Development, 1890-2005
Olivetti (2013) also notes that when the early OECD economies are not included,
the U-shaped LFP is more muted. The reason behind this is two fold. One reason is
there was a stigma towards working women in early industrialization countries and
the second reason is that women have more comparative advantage in type of jobs at
which they can use their mental power instead of physical power. Olivetti describes
this phenomenon as women’s dislike towards ’brawn jobs’ as opposed to brain jobs.
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Figure 1.3: Mammen and Paxson, 2000
There is further evidence that the relationship between labor force participation
and economic development is U-shaped in several cross-country studies as well. Mam-
men and Paxson (2000) examine 90 countries from 1970s to 1980s and found that labor
force participation displays U-shaped over economic development. Their graph is in
figure 1.3. Luci (2009) uses a larger panel data set to eliminate the possible endogene-
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Figure 1.4: Luci, 2009
ity between economic growth and female labor force participation. She conducts her
research on 184 countries from 1965 to 2005 and performed system GMM estimation.
As a result, she also confirms the U-shaped participation rate over economic develop-
ment. The depiction of her results can be seen in figure 1.4. Lastly, Olivetti (2013)
shows additional evidence by examining 16 developed countries and confirms the U-
shaped labor force participation. She also discusses whether a ’country’s transition
to a modern path of economic development’ affect the labor force participation.
1.1.2 U-shape in Time Series
Goldin (1990) argues that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
married women’s labor force participation rate was U-shaped over economic devel-
opment in the United States. Although official statistics cannot fully capture the
U-shaped, Goldin (1990) shows that 1890 participation rate was as high as 1940 rate
and it reached a trough around 1920s. Since 1920s, the female participation rate has
been rising. This rise was fast initially but later it slowed down over time.
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The U-shaped female labor force participation is a claim as striking as it seems
but the reason behind this U-shaped is more appealing. Goldin talks about three
biases that pre-1940 data has 1: Change in definition of labor force, change in the
locus of production in the economy (Production moves from home to market.) and
omission of workers in the census count (Goldin (1990)).
Before 1940, individuals are included in the labor force under the gainful worker
concept. An individual is gainfully employed if she reports herself as a paid worker.
After 1940, labor force is defined to be economically active population as in Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO, henceforth) construction. According to this defini-
tion, labor force includes all individuals working for pay, unpaid family workers and
unemployed people looking for jobs during the survey week. Once Goldin corrects the
definition of labor force before the 1940 levels, she finds that labor force participation
of married women does not remarkably change.
The second bias is the change in the locus of production in the economy. According
to this, as the main locus of production shifts from home to market, more and more
women started looking for jobs in the market. This line of thought essentially focuses
on the transition of women we were out of labor force into labor force as unemployed.
Goldin questions if this might be the root of U-shaped labor force participation.
However, her calculations did not reveal a remarkable change in the shape of labor
force participation of married women.
The third bias is the most serious one pre-1940 data has. Especially in the late
19th century and early 20th century, large fraction of working women were reluctant
to report their employment or census takers were biased against reporting womens
employment although they were engaging in unpaid employment within their families
excluding homemaking activities. Conk (1980) provides evidence that most census
1Section 2, Economic Development and the Life Cycle of Work
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Figure 1.5: Labor Force Participation of Married Women and Economic
Development, 1890-1980, US Population Census 1960 and 2010. Mitchell(1998) for
GDP per Capita
takers mostly presumed that married and adult women are unemployed and altered
data if occupations were unusual and atypical of female jobs. There are especially
three occupations where people tent to misreport their employment status: Boarding-
house keepers, agricultural workers and manufacturing workers. When Goldin (1990)
adjustments of these workers and added to the labor force data, she found that LFP
of women in 1890 was equal to or above 1940 participation rate of white women. Fig-
ure 1.5 displays this correction along with the original data points. As it is seen, the
labor force participation of married women is, in fact, U-shaped between the years
1890 and 1940.
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Figure 1.6: Trends in female labor force participation, 1890-2005. Olivetti (2013)
In the light of Goldin’s work, Olivetti (2013) shows that 16 developed countries
female labor force participation over economic development between 1890 and 2005.
Apart from Canada and the United States, most countries show U-shaped female LFP
although the U-shaped is more muted in some cases. Canada and the US displays an
increasing trend but as mentioned earlier, US case is somewhat problematic. Figure
1.6 displays these countries.
Recent literature shows that many developing countries explain the decrease in
their female LFP over economic development with U-shaped trend. Figure 1.7 dis-
plays the movement of female LFP between 1955 and 2000 in Turkey. Female LFP
declined 72 percent in 1955 to about 26 percent in 2000. Tansel (2002) explains this
decrease by linking it to U-shaped LFP. She asserts that there will be an upturn
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Figure 1.7: Female labor force participation in Turkey, 1955-2000. Tansel (2002)
in female LFP in the upcoming decades because the decline in the female LFP has
slowed down significantly.
Lastly, 1.8 state that structural transformation pushes a lot of women out of
agricultural sector while the growing mechanization in agriculture and manufacturing
limit the opportunity for these women to find jobs again because of their low education
and skill level. They conclude this is the main reason behind India’s decreasing female
LFP in the recent years.
1.1.3 Conclusion
The movement of female labor force participation over economic development
has divided the literature into two. While one part of the literature follows Becker
(2010) and claims an increasing trend, the other part follows Boserup (1970) and
claims a U-shaped. Although it has not received as attention as Becker’s increasing
13
Figure 1.8: Female Labor Force Participation, 1983-2012. Mehrotra and Parida
(2017)
LFP trend, Boserup’s U-shaped female LFP has been widely studied and proved in
many empirical studies. Both cross country and time series analysis show that U-
shaped female LFP is an important phenomena which deserves to be studied more
to understand the relation between economic development and female labor supply.
14
Chapter 2
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION, MARKETIZATION AND FEMALE
LABOR SUPPLY
2.1 Introduction
The causal relationship between female labor force participation (LFP, hereafter)
and economic development have been one of the fundamental questions in economic
history. Although the economists largely agree on the positive effect of female LFP on
economic development, the disagreement about the impact of economic development
on female LFP is ongoing. While Becker’s Modernization Neoclassical Approach
assumes a positive effect of economic development on female LFP, there is a vast
amount of literature which claims a curvilinear impact since Boserup (1970). Growth
initially reduces female LFP and then increases as the economy continues to grow.
This U-shaped structure of female LFP over economic development is the main topic
of this paper.
Figure 2.1 displays the 161 countries’ female LFP and logarithmic GDP per capita
paired together with the quadratic fitted line which is U-shaped. The data is taken
from Word Development Indicators (WDI, hereafter). The data points are only from
2014 data but the same shape prevails in almost every decade since 1980.
The U-shaped female labor force participation has two stages. The first stage is
the decreasing part which is generally observed in low income or developing countries.
According to Boserup, most women work on family farms as agricultural workers and
contribute into production apart from home production. Since they work at home,
their fertility rate is high. In agricultural societies, women have high reproduction
15
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Figure 2.1: Female LFP in 2012
rates because more children raise the family income since they can participate in
agricultural production. Many households include extended family members such as
grandparents. Since the small children are taken care of by them, all the other family
members have time to work at the family enterprises. Figure 2.2 provides a detailed
overview of Figure 2.1. I define countries whose agricultural production share in its
GDP is in the top 20 percent of the world agricultural production share distribution.
Figure 2.2 displays that all those countries accumulate on the left side of the graph
where the fitted LFP decreases over economic development.
Female LFP begins to fall as the country steps into the industrialization stage.
Reduction of agricultural sector and labor mobility as a result of mechanization makes
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Figure 2.2: Sectoral Distribution of Countries
it more difficult for women to combine market and home work. The demand for
female workers decreases when it is combined with the required physical strength to
use machines in early industrialization and stigma towards working women in these
societies. Ngai and Olivetti (2015) define this period with a lot of ”brawn” jobs
versus ’brain’ jobs, clashing women’s lack of comparative advantage on these brawn
jobs. The graph on the top right corner at Figure 2.2 shows the countries whose
manufacture production share is in the top 20 percent of the world distribution.
They accumulate on the mid section of the graph.
With further advancement in technology and rise of the service economy, female
LFP starts rising again in the second stage. This stage is when female LFP rises
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in developed countries due mostly to the mechanisms known from modernization of
neoclassical approach. Rise of the service sector and consequently the rising demand
for mental skills rather than motor skills increases the demand for female workers.
Many developed countries such as United States, Britain and France can be counted
in this stage. The graph on the bottom left corner at Figure 2.2 shows the countries
whose service production share is in the top 20 percent of the world distribution.
They accumulate on the right side of the graph.
Hence, U-shape female LFP over economic development basically talks about
changing labor supply decisions of women as well as labor demand decisions of em-
ployers given women’s natural skill set and how these skill sets are demanded condi-
tional on the changes in the economy. Ngai and Olivetti (2015) propose a theoretical
framework to create the U-shape in their ’very preliminary ’ paper. However, their
study do not go beyond defining a model. This study completes this attempt by
extending their theoretical framework and as well as providing quantitative analysis.
For this purpose, I focus on three forces which together can alter the movement
of female labor force participation. First one is the transition of women from home
to market. Late nineteenth century was different from the twentieth century in two
aspects. First, there was a stigma towards married women working outside. Second,
women were mostly working as agriculture workers both in family enterprises and
market excluding house chorus. With the industrial revolution and decreasing preju-
dice towards married women working in the market, more and more women start to
move from home to market as workers. This transition will be named as ”marketiza-
tion” in the paper following Ngai and Petrongolo (2014). However, the marketization
does not necessarily increase the working hours of married women in every sector
equally which takes us to the second force.
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The second force is the transition of workers between different sectors. Women
have comparative advantage over brain jobs as opposed to brawn jobs so their work-
ing hours increase with the expansion of the sectors which they have comparative
advantage. If the expansion is in the sector in which they do not have comparative
advantage, then their working hours decreased. Hence, it creates a reallocation of la-
bor within sectors depending on their skill set. This process will be called ”structural
transformation” following Herrendorf et al. (2013).
The third force is the allocation between work and leisure time. This is a choice
for women to engage in production overall or just having some leisure hours. Both
the marketization and structural transformation forces are challenged/propagated by
this force. A higher technology may cause women to supply more labor to the market
which is the result of marketization. This move is propagated by leisure-work choice
since women are also willing to sacrifice their leisure time in addition to their home
working hours. On the other hand, if the technological growth is in a sector which
they do not have comparative advantage, then they decrease their labor allocation
even more to increase not only home production but also leisure. This force is called
”Leisure-work choice” in this paper.
Related Literature
One strand of the related literature is the change in female labor supply over
economic development. This paper supports a curvilinear shape of female lfp over
economic development hich was first claimed by Boserup (1970) and supported by
many other studies such as Goldin (1990), Luci (2009), Olivetti (2013).
This paper is also closely related to Ngai and Olivetti (2015) and Ngai and Petron-
golo (2014) in terms of analyzing the changes labor supply between sectors. In that
sense, my model is very similar to the models in these two papers. Similar framework
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has also been used by many other papers such as Akbulut (2011), Ngai and Pissarides
(2008).
Therefore, this paper tries to generate U-shaped female labor force with these
three forces. The point of this paper is to mechanically and quantitatively show that
marketization, structural transformation and leisure-work choices are able to create
U-shaped female labor force participation. Section 2.2 introduces the data. Section
2.3 provides empirical evidence. Section 2.4 presents the model. Section 2.5 supplies
calibration of the model. Section 2.6 states the calibration results. Finally, Section
2.7 concludes.
2.2 Data
The data on female labor force participation, GDP and sectoral value added shares
used in the Section 2.1 are taken from World Development Indicators (WDI, here-
after). Labor force participation is defined as the proportion of economically active
female population to the entire female population who are 15 and higher. GDP is
defined as the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus
any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products.
Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtract-
ing intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation
of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin
of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification
(ISIC), revision 3. Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry,
hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. Manu-
facturing refers to industries belonging to ISIC divisions 15-37. Services correspond
to ISIC divisions 50-99 and they include value added in wholesale and retail trade
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(including hotels and restaurants), transport, and government, financial, professional,
and personal services such as education, health care, and real estate services.”1
For calibration of model parameters, I use US data from Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series (IPUMS-USA, hereafter). The data includes people with their age,
sex, marital status, their employment and labor force status, their occupation and
information about which industry and occupation they work. I only used married
women observations because single women almost act like men in the data. The data
is between 1965 and 2012. Observations before 2000 is decennial while it is annual
after 2000. It must be because of American Community Surveys designed to replace
the Census long-form after 2000. I calculate sectoral labor force statistics of both
genders.
The individuals are between 16 and 65 and they are all married (spouse present).
They are all employed. I include both the full and part time employed individuals
because the scope of this study is not related to job type.
I categorize industries documented in ”IND1950” into three broad sectors. This
categorization is similar to WDI categorization: agriculture, manufacture and service.
The classification for each sector is made by using IND1950 variable. Agriculture sec-
tor includes Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing. Manufacturing sector includes Min-
ing, Construction and Manufacturing goods. Service sector includes Transportation,
Communication, and Other Utilities, Wholesale and Retail Trade, Finance, Insurance,
and Real Estate, Business and Repair Services, Personal services, Entertainment and
Recreation Services, Professional and Related Services and Public Administration.
I also calculate sectoral labor allocation at home for both genders. In this sense, I
used Multinational Time Use Survey (MTUS) for the United States 2. It is composed
1All of the definitions are taken from WDI.
2This document presents results drawn from the Multinational Time Use Study (MTUS), but the
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of diaries of people from each country. Each diary includes how many minutes an
individual spends on a particular activity such as working, travel, sleeping or leisure
time. Each row in the dataset represents for one person’s 24 hours.
The data is from 1965 to 2012. I only use the diaries which are good quality
(badcase=0). The individuals are again between 16 and 65 and they are all married.
All the individuals are either part-time or full-time employed.
Before proceeding further, it is important to define market, home production and
leisure. Market production is the time spent on the production of goods and services.
Individuals derive utility from the output by consuming or selling it. Also, the time
spent is paid. Home production is defined as the time spent on the production of
goods and services. Different from leisure, individuals derive utility from the output
of the production but not the time spent on production and home production output
can be ’marketized’ unlike leisure. From here, it is already clear that leisure consists of
activities which individuals derive utility from the time spent on that activity and they
cannot be marketized (Ngai and Pissarides (2008)). Given these, the classification of
MTUS activities based on these definitions is as follows.
The market work time includes paid work as the main or second job that takes
place in the market. I do not include travel to work time as part of the market work.
Sectoral categorization in the market are made according to IPUMS categorization
although the the items listed for each industry are not entirely the same. I use the
variable occup for this classification and I try to choose the similar categories with
IND1950 in IPUMS-USA for each sector.
interpretation of this data and other views expressed in this text are those of the author. This text
does not necessarily represent the views of the MTUS team or any agency which has contributed
data to the MTUS archive. The author bears full responsibility for all errors and omissions in the
interpretation of the MTUS data.
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Home production time includes paid work that takes place at home as well as
other activities that are not paid. The reason behind adding unpaid activities is all of
these activities would be a paid job in the market if not done at home. Hence, I think
including them as part of home production is significant. In this sense, gardening
and fishing is in home agriculture 3. Manufacturing includes cooking, home and
vehicle maintenance and knitting 4.Finally, service sector includes all the other house
chores such as cleaning, child care, shopping or pet care 5. I agree that some of these
activities such as cooking, fishing or knitting can be counted as leisure activity as
some people like to do these as hobby. In my analyses, I choose to ignore this fact as
it is hard to distinguish it from the data.
Lastly, leisure time includes activities such as party with friends, social events,
sports and exercises 6. I exclude sleeping time from my classifications.
2.3 Evidence
The regression is a cross country analysis which includes GDP per capita and
labor force participation for both genders in 2012. The female data includes 161
countries, whereas the male data includes 35 countries. The aim of this analysis is to
formally prove the existence of U-shape female LFP over economic development for
female workers as well as compare it with their male counterparts.
I run the following regression equation for both genders separately to tests if the
labor force participation of women actually follows a U-shape:
flfpt = β1 + β2gdppci + β3gdppc
2
i
3main46
4main18, main22, main54
5main19, main20, main21, main24, main25, main27, main28, main29, main30, main31, main32,
main47, main66, main67
6main17, main33-38, main40, main42-45, main48, main50-52, main55-50
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Table 2.1, column (2) displays a statistically significant U-shape pattern for female la-
bor force participation. On the other hand, column (3) does not display a statistically
significant U-shape pattern even on the 10 percent p value.
Table 2.1: LFP and Economic Development, 2012
(1) (2) (3)
Female Male
Log GDP per capita -53.31*** -14.83
(9.86) (10.70)
Log GDP per capita squared 3.15*** 0.81
(0.55) (0.63)
Constant 269.99*** 139.75***
(43.31) (43.95)
N 161 35
R2 0.18 0.16
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Source: World Bank
A similar analysis on a panel dataset of 16 selected developed countries is done by
Olivetti (2013)7. As the time period spans a wide range of years (1890-2015), labor
force participation may depend on certain country-specific characteristics. Hence, she
also adds country and year fixed effects. Results indicate that U-shaped female labor
7The countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States
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force participation is statistically significant even with 1 percent pvalue. On the other
hand it is statistically insignificant for male workers (Olivetti (2013)).
2.4 Static Model
Motivated by the facts represented in the previous section, this section presents
a general equilibrium model for a multi-sector economy to describe the male and
female market and home hours. The proposed model in this section is static model
with no capital. The only factor of production is labor hours and sector-specific labor
productivity.
It should be noted that the proposed model solely relies on between-sectors forces
to deliver gender-specific labor allocation trends. Hence uneven technological growth
together with gender specific parameters will be the source of the labor supply de-
cisions. In this sense, having a static model will be enough to generate a U-shaped
LFP. Considering the fact that there is evidence about U-shaped female lfp using
cross-sectional data as well as time series data (Goldin (1990)), the static version is
a simple but a good way to begin the analysis.
A more sophisticated version of this model is to add capital and make the model
dynamic to analyze life-cycle behavior of individuals. The dynamic version will also be
important to attribute a source to labor productivity growth such as capital intensity
or TFP. Moreover, we could also analyze how skill formation such as female education
can change their life time choices when confronted with uneven technological growth.
In the appendix, I describe the dynamic version of it with a note of the difference
between the static and dynamic version. The readers can directly jump to Section B
to see the dynamic model. For now, I will continue with describing static model.
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2.4.1 Setup and Primitives
There are 6 sectors to allocate labor: Agriculture (a), manufacturing (m) and
service (s) sectors in the market and at home. The set of sectors is denoted by
j ∈ J = {a,m, s}
Households consist of one male (m˜) and one female (f˜) partners. I will denote
the set of genders as g ∈ G = {m˜, f˜}. Both of them allocate resources between home
and market sectors and engage in income pooling. Male and female individuals differ
by the wage they receive in the market.
2.4.2 Production Technology
For simplicity, production technology is assumed to be as follows:
F (Aj, Hj) = AjHj (2.1)
where Aj is the market production technology for sector j and Hj is the labor
aggregator which is assumed to be as follows:
Hj = [ξjH
η
f˜j
+ (1− ξj)Hηm˜j]
1
η ∀j ∈ J (2.2)
where ξj is the share of female labor time on the production of market good j. Eco-
nomically speaking, this can be attributed to comparative advantage of female workers
in sector j. If ξj > ξk, this means women have comparative advantage in sector j
as opposed to sector k. Also, Hf˜ j is the female hours in the production of market
j-good, whereas Hm˜j is the male hours in the production of market j-good. The
elasticity of substitution between male and female working hours is denoted by 1
1−η .
Representative firm in each sector j solves the following profit maximization prob-
lem at each period:
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max
Hmj ,Hfj
pjF (Aj, Hj)− wmjHmj − wfjHfj (2.3)
2.4.3 Preferences
There is a representative household, which is made up of a male and female
members. The household lives for an infinite number of periods and derives utility
from consumption and leisure. The preferences are given by:
U(C,L) (2.4)
which C represents the consumption of composite good and L is total leisure time.
The utility function U is given by:
U(C,L) = µln(C) + (1− µ)ln(L) (2.5)
where µ is the weight of the consumption good in the utility function.
The composite goods L and leisure C are assumed to take the following forms:
L = (ξlL
ηl
f + (1− ξl)Lηlm)
1
ηl (2.6)
C =
[∑
j∈J
κjC
θ
j
] 1
θ
(2.7)
where Lm is the leisure of the male whereas Lf is the leisure of the female.
Cj is the sector j composite good. I use κj as share parameters. For instance,
κa ∈ [0, 1] stands for the share of agricultural composite good, Ca on household
utility. Similarly, κm ∈ [0, 1] stands for share of manufactured composite good, Cm
and κs ∈ [0, 1] stands for share of service composite good, Cs. Lastly, 11−θ stands for
elasticity of substitution between different composite commodities.
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Composite commodities are CES function of goods produced both at home and
in the market for each sector. For each j ∈ J = {a,m, s};
Cj = [ψjc

j + (1− ψj)cˆj]
1
 ∀j ∈ J (2.8)
where cj is the market good consumption, cˆj is the home good consumption. It
is assumed both goods are substitutes by CES aggregator. ψj is the share of market
good in the composite consumption good and 1
1− is the elasticity of substitution
between home and market good.
It is assumed that home good is produced with the following technology:
cˆj = AˆjHˆj ∀j ∈ J
= Aˆj[ξˆjHˆ
η
f˜j
+ (1− ξˆj)Hˆηm˜j]
1
η (2.9)
where Aˆj is the home technology, ξˆj is the share of female time, Hˆf˜ , in the pro-
duction of home good and (1 − ξˆj) is the share of male time, Hˆm˜j. The elasticity of
substitution between male and female working hours is denoted by 1
1−η .
In this economy, men and women are endowed with one unit of time. Each of
them allocates this unit of time to home production, market production and leisure.
The time allocation constraint for the representative male is given by:
H¯m˜ =
∑
j
Hm˜j +
∑
j
Hˆm˜j + Lm˜ (2.10)
The time allocation constraint for the representative female is given by:
H¯f˜ =
∑
j
Hf˜ j +
∑
j
Hˆf˜ j + Lm˜ (2.11)
Hm˜ and Hf˜ are male and female time in the production of market good, respec-
tively.
Households spend their resources on consumption on market goods. They receive
income from market work.
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Household’s budget constraint is as follows:
∑
j
pjcj =
∑
g∈G
∑
j∈J
wgjHgj (2.12)
Given these, representative household’s sequential problem is as follows:
max
{{cj ,cˆj ,Hgj ,Hˆgj}{g,j}}
U(C,L) (2.13)
subject to
∑
j
pjcj =
∑
g
∑
j
wgjHgj (2.14)
cˆj = Aˆj[ξˆjHˆ
η
f˜j
+ (1− ξˆj)Hˆηm˜j]
1
η ∀j ∈ J (2.15)
Cj = [ψjc

j + (1− ψj)cˆj]
1
 ∀j ∈ J (2.16)
H¯g = Hgj + Hˆgj + Lg ∀g ∈ G (2.17)
L = (ξlL
ηl
f˜
+ (1− ξl)Lηlm˜)
1
ηl (2.18)
Thus, household consume and work. They consume all the home production as
well as market agriculture and service goods.
2.4.4 Characterization of Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium in this economy is a collection of allocations
{cj, cˆj, Hgj, Hˆgj, Lg}g∈G,j∈J and prices
[pj, wmj, wfj] such that given values of the state variables
(Aj, Aˆj) and given prices,
(i) The allocations maximize firm’s profit (2.3)
(ii) The allocations maximize household’s utility (2.13)
(iii) All markets clear
The solution methodology consists of two steps. First, I solve for the optimal time
allocations across home and market for each sector. And then, I solve for the optimal
time allocations across different sectors. As the model is a Pareto optimal model, by
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Second Welfare Theorem, I solve social planners problem. The reader may refer to
section A for detailed solution steps.
First order conditions to problem (2.13) yields the following important equilibrium
condition:
αj
(
Hfj
Hmj
)η−1
= xj (2.19)
where xj =
wf˜j
wm˜j
is the gender wage ratio and αj =
ξj
1−ξj captures the comparative
advantage of women, i.e. if αj is close to 1 in sector j ∈ J = {a,m, s
rbrace, women have comparative advantage in sector j whereas if it is close to 0, men
have comparative advantage in that sector.
Assuming free mobility across sectors implies equal marginal rate of technical
substitution:
wf˜ j
wm˜j
=
wf˜
wm˜
= x (2.20)
Hence, equation (2.19) becomes:
αj
(
Hfj
Hmj
)η−1
= x (2.21)
According to this equation, equilibrium wage ratio can only increase if there is a
rise in relative female labor supply (
Hfj
Hmj
) or a rise in female specific parameter ξj which
represents their comparative advantage in sector j. This rise is typically interpreted
as a gender-biased demand shift due to various factors such as a change in social
norms on behalf of women (Goldin (2006)), female friendly technological change or
reduced distortions in the allocation of gender talents (Ngai and Petrongolo (2014)).
Similarly,
αˆj
(
Hˆf˜ j
Hˆm˜j
)η−1
= x (2.22)
αl
(
Lf˜
Lm˜
)ηl−1
= x (2.23)
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The second important solution yields what percentage of total work hours is allo-
cated to home and market production for each gender. Let Ngj be the optimal labor
allocation of gender g in sector j.
Ngj = Hgj + Hˆgj ∀j, g (2.24)
Given this, the optimal share of time allocated to market and home production is
as follows:
Hf˜ j =
Nf˜ j
1 +Bj
(2.25)
Hm˜j =
Nm˜j
1 +Bj
(2.26)
Hˆf˜ j =
Nf˜ jBj
1 +Bj
(2.27)
Hˆm˜jt =
Nm˜jBj
1 +Bj
(2.28)
where Bj = { ψj1−ψj
(
Aj
Aˆj
)
} 1−1 .
It should be noted that this results depends on the assumption that ξj = ξˆj.
Economically speaking, this means women do not have any comparative advantage
between market and home but they do so between sectors. Hence, I assume indi-
viduals have comparative advantage in producing the goods independent of where
the good is produced. This is not a very strong assumption considering the model
is intended to catch the labor movements between home and market as a result of
technological change.
By construction,  is the substitution parameter between home and market j-good.
If they are good substitutes ( ∈ (0, 1]), a relative increase in market technology will
increase the share of time allocated to market production for both genders. Similarly
if the relative technology increases at home, this time share of home time allocation
will increase.
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Define
Nj = [ξjN
η
f˜j
+ (1− ξj)Nηm˜j]
1
η (2.29)
Given these, we can define market and home consumption in each sector as a
function of Nj. Moreover, this will let us define the aggregate consumption as a
function of Nj.
cj = Aj
1
1 +Bj
Nj (2.30)
cˆj = Aˆj
Bj
1 +Bj
Nj (2.31)
Cj = EjNj (2.32)
where Ej =
[
ψjA

j
(
1
1+Bj
)
+ (1− ψj)Aˆj
(
Bj
1+Bj
)] 1
.
This takes us to one of the important implications of this model.
cj
cˆj
=
[
Aj
Aˆj
ψ
1− ψ
] 1
1−
(2.33)
where  < 1 by construction. Equation (2.33) is the marketization equation of
j-good given j ∈ J = {a,m, s}. It says a higher productivity growth in market leads
to higher consumption of market j-goods compared to home j-goods. The pace of this
shift from home to market depends on the share of market j-good ψ as well as the
elasticity of substitution parameter between market and home goods . For that, if
the share of market j-good is bigger (ψ close to 1) and market and home goods are
good substitutes ( ∈ [0, 1]) then the marketization will be faster.
This leads us to derive marketization equation for labor supply. Using equations
(2.25) for female labors at home and in the market,
Hf˜ j
Hˆf˜ j
=
1
Bj
=
[
ψj
1− ψj
(
Aj
Aˆj
)] 11−
(2.34)
Hence, an uneven technological growth in the market compared to home shifts
labors from home to market. The pace if shift is affected by the market share ψ and
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elasticity of substitution between parameter . As before, I assume home and market
goods as good substitutes so  ∈ [0, 1].
Total time allocation H¯g is allocated across work and leisure as mentioned above:
H¯g =
∑
j Ngj + Lg for both genders g = {f˜ , m˜}. Given this, optimization across
sectors yields the following result between work and leisure:
αj
(
Nf˜ j
Nm˜j
)η−1
= αl
(
Lf˜
Lm˜
)ηl−1
(2.35)
where αj =
ξj
1−ξj and αl =
ξl
1−ξl . This ratio is equal to the gender wage ratio x =
wf˜
wm˜
as before. This equation tells us that relative work is proportional to relative leisure
hours.
The relative working time in sector j for women depends on their competitive
advantage and the wage ratio and the size of the market:
Nf˜ j
Nfk
=
Gf˜ (x, j)
Gf˜ (x, k)
(2.36)
where Gf (x, j) =
(
ξ
θ
η
j (κjE
θ
j )F (x, j)
θ
η
−1
) 1
1−θ
and
F (x, k) = 1 + α
1
η−1
j x
η
1−η .
Equation (2.36) denotes the structural transformation of labor from one sector to
the other. This movement depends on technological growth (Aj and Aˆj), productivity
(x) and comparative advantage (αj) of women as well as the share of the compos-
ite commodity (κj). The pace of movement is affected by elasticity of substitution
parameter (η) between the labors as well as the composite commodities (θ).
The following equation is the one which shows the relationship between leisure
choice and work time. This result is important because compared to other relevant
models in the literature, this model can answer the question of what women do
if they do not work either at home or in the market. Hence, in case of a very high
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technological growth in the market, the model will not be able to produce 100 percent
labor force participation.
Nf˜ j
Lf˜
=
µ
1− µκjE
θ
j
N θj
Cθ
F (x, l)
F (x, j)
(2.37)
When summed over the sectors j, equation (2.37) comes down to following:
N¯f˜ j
Lf˜
=
µ
1− µ
F (x, l)∑
j F (x.j)
(2.38)
where
N¯f˜ j =
∑
j
Nf˜ j (2.39)
.
Hence, women’s decisions over leisure and work is positively dependent upon their
comparative advantage in leisure as well as the elasticity of substitution parameter
between male and female leisure. Given that, having a higher preference over leisure
(µ) also plays a positive role on leisure choice.
Female labor force participation is defined as the ratio of total market work to
total time allocation. Hence,
lfpf˜ =
∑
j Hf˜ j
H¯f˜
(2.40)
Using total work time Nfj and H¯fj, this equation can be expressed as follows:
lfpf˜ =
∑
j
Hf˜ j
Nf˜ j
(
N¯f˜ j
Nf˜ j
+
Lf˜
Nf˜ j
)−1
(2.41)
Without the last term, the model is identical to Ngai and Olivetti 2013. However
adding leisure to this model is important as it generalizes the model and gives an
incentive to women not to work either at home or in the market. Moreover, this is also
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important if we consider under-counting of women who works at family enterprises in
the beginning of 19th century. In the US, many women were not counted as employed
although they were working in family enterprises as unpaid workers. Adding those
women back into labor force actually creates the U-shaped labor force participation.
This model without leisure does not grasp that fact. If we include both home and
market labor hours as part of the labor force, this model without leisure will give us
100 percent labor force participation which is not realistic.
Now, if we examine each term in the labor force participation one by one, it
will give us a clear understanding about the roots of U-shape. By equation (2.25),
Hf˜j
Nf˜j
= 1
1+Bj
. Here is the proposition for that.
Proposition 2.4.1 If there is a higher technological growth in the market relative to
home technology, Bj will decrease given  ∈ [0, 1]. Then, 11+Bj will increase.
Proof 2.4.1.1 By equation (2.34),
1
1 +Bj
=
1
1 +
[
ψj
1−ψj
(
Aj
Aˆj
)] 1−1
According to this, higher relative technological growth in sector j compared to home
technology, will decrease the denominator as  ∈ [0, 1]. Decrease in denominator
increase the entire term. Now, the pace of this decrease will depend on how big the
market share of sector j. If it is big, then the pace of increase will be higher as a
result of relative technological growth.
Note that, this increase represents labors transition from home to market which is
marketization. A higher market share in a particular sector will push female workers
from home to market then the relative technology improves.
By equation (2.36) and (2.39),
N¯f˜j
Nf˜j
=
∑
j Gf˜ (x,j)
Gf˜(x,j)
. The following proposition states
the movement of this term, when there is a technological change in sector j.
35
Proposition 2.4.2 If relative technological growth is higher in sector j compared to
sector k, given these two goods are poor substitutes (θ < 0) and the market shares of
sector j is big enough (ψj > ψk ∀k 6= j), it will decrease labor allocated to sector j.
Proof 2.4.2.1 The proof of this statement relies on the log linearization of the term
N¯f˜j
Nf˜j
around the steady state. As the proposition is based on relative technology levels
γj =
Aj
Aˆj
rather than individual technology levels.
Define pij = ξ
θ
η
j κj(1− ψ)
θ−η
η AˆθjF (x, j)
θ−η
η .
Given this,
log(
N¯f˜ j
Nf˜ j
) =
1
1− θ
log
∑
j
pij
(
Bj
1 +Bj
) θ(−1)

− log
pij ( Bj
1 +Bj
) θ(−1)


Let y˜ = y−y
∗
y∗ for any variable y. Also, let (γ
∗
a, γ
∗
m, γ
∗
s ) be the equilibrium rela-
tive technologies. Taking the first order Taylor approximation leads to the following
equation:
˜N¯ ˜f j
N˜f j
=
1
1− θ
∑
j
pij
(
Bj
1+Bj
) θ(−1)

∑
j pij
(
B∗j
1+Bj
) θ(−1)

θ
B1−j
1 +Bj
ψj
1− ψj γ

j γ˜j

− 1
1− θ
[
θ
B1−j
1 +Bj
ψj
1− ψj γ

j γ˜j
]
(2.42)
First of all, if there was only one sector at home and in the market, equation (2.42)
would be equal to zero as first and the second term would be equal to each other. Hence
with one sector only, we would not be able to grasp structural transformation.
Now if the relative technology in sector j is higher than sector k, this will decrease
the second term as θ < 0. Together with the minus sign, it will be an increase. The
same decrease will happen in the same amount in the first term for sector j. However,
as the technology k is also growing, this will decrease the first term even more. Given
the share of market j is big enough, the decrease in the first term will be dominated
by the increase in the second term. Hence,
N¯f˜j
Nf˜j
will increase.
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Hence, if relative technological growth is higher in sector j compared to sector k,
given these two goods are poor substitutes (θ < 0) and sector j has a higher market
share , it will decrease labor allocated to sector j. This is the implication of structural
transformation in the literature. Higher technological growth in sector j will increase
the relative prices in this sector. It will decrease the labor allocated to this sector j
towards the sector whose relative prices are lower.
Finally, by equation (2.37), higher relative technological growth in sector j leads
to decrease in relative leisure hours compared to total work hours given η > θ. This
movement represents labors’ movement between leisure-work.
Proposition 2.4.3 Higher relative technological growth in sector j leads to decrease
in relative leisure hours compared to total work hours given κj is big enough.
Proof 2.4.3.1 By log linearization of equation (2.37) is as follows:
log
(
Nj
L
)
= log(Λ1) + θlog(Ej) + log(
N θj
Cθ
)
where Λ1 =
µ
1−µκj
F (x,l)
F (x,j)
.
The first order Taylor approximation of log(Ej) is as follows:
E˜j
Ej
= Λ2
+
1− 

log(1 + 1
B∗j
)
+
1
1 + 1B∗j
(1− )
(
ψj
1− ψj γ

j
)1− γ˜j
γj

where Λ2 =
1

log
(
(1− ψj)Aˆj
)
. According to this equation, a technological growth
in sector j, will increase E. This increase affects
Nf˜j
Lf
as a decrease as θ is negative
(goods in different sectors are poor substitutes).
37
Here is the Taylor approximation of C
θ
Nθj
. Define CN = C
θ
Nθj
.
C˜N
CN
=
1
CN∗
−
∑
j
κjθEθ−1j 1
(1− ψj)Aˆj
(
1
1 + 1
Bj
)−1 1 1
B2j

×( ψj
1− ψj
) 1
−1
γ

−1
j
γ˜j
γj
+
∂
Nf˜j
Nf˜k
∂γj

Given θ < 0, the second term decreases as technology rises in sector j. Also,
we already know from the structural transformation proposition that
Nf˜j
Nf˜k
decreases.
Overall, the direction of the change will depend on the share of composite commodities
κj as well as the market share as established in Proposition 4.2.1. Overall, if the
structural transformation dominates, the
Nθj
Cθ
increases. Otherwise, it will decrease.
Therefore, the analytical implication of the previous three proposition is as follows:
Decrease in female lfp is mostly originated by structural transformation. If this force
can dominate people’s leisure-work incentives and marketization, then lfp will de-
crease. Increase in female lfp is originated by marketization and leisure-work choices.
If this force dominates structural transformation, then female lfp will increase.
2.5 Calibration
In this section, I quantitatively assess the importance of marketization, structural
transformation and leisure-work movements in accounting for the observed movements
in married women’s labor force participation over economic development in Figure
2.1.
In a nutshell, I calibrate model parameters based on US data between 1965-2012.
The current calibration requires me to have certain data points such as sectoral share
of total market and home hours with their gender components. There are in total
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20 parameters in the model. Among these 6 of them are taken from the data or
existing literature. One of the technology parameters is normalized to 1. Hence,
13 of them are calibrated. Table 2.2 shows the parameters taken from the existing
literature whereas Table 2.3 shows the calibrated parameters. The explanation for
each of these parameter choice is given in Section 2.5.2 and 2.5.3.
Table 2.2: Parameters from Literature
Parameters Values Source
 0.6 Aguiar et.al (2012)
θ -5.76 Various estimates
µ 0.6 Ngai and Petrongolo (2016)
κa 0.02 Herrendorf et.al (2013a)
κs 0.17 Herrendorf et.al (2013a)
κs 0.81 Herrendorf et.al (2013a)
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Table 2.3: Calibrated Parameters
Parameters Value
Relative time endowment H¯m˜
H¯f˜
1.94
Elas of subs btw male and female hrs η -2.3
Elas of subs btw male and female leis ηl 2.5
Agr female mrkt share ξa 0.85
Man female mrkt share ξm 0.16
Ser female mrkt share ξs 0.97
Share of agr market good ψa 0.02
Share of man market good ψm 0.003
Share of ser market good ψs 0.08
6 Technology parameters
2.5.1 Data Targets
The labor force participation of women are related to changes in relevant data
moments between the start and end of the sample period. The list of the 13 moments
are given in Table 2.4 and my procedure to use them as well as more detailed empirical
findings are explained in Section 2.5.2.
Sector shares are obtained from IPUMS-USA and is adjusted for the demographics
as explained in Section 2.2. Sectoral categorization are also already explained in
Section 2.2 both for IPUMS-USA and MTUS.
Table 2.5 displays the market shares of each sector among total hours worked from
IPUMS-USA. First four rows show the distribution of total market hours between
three different sectors. I calculate total market hours by multiplying number of hours
worked in a week (hrswork2) with number of weeks worked in the previous year
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Table 2.4: Moments
Moments Data Model
Change in wage ratio 36.46 36.46
Wage ratio 0.50 0.50
Change in male-female hours ratio 0.30 .30
Change in male-female leisure hours ratio -0.24 -0.24
Male to female agr ratio (Hm˜a
Hf˜a
) 1.96 1.96
Male to female man ratio (Hm˜m
Hf˜m
) 5.46 5.49
Male to female ser ratio (Hm˜s
Hf˜s
) 1.10 1.10
Female agr market to home ratio (
Hf˜a
Hˆf˜a
) 0.37 0.34
Female man market to home ratio (
Hf˜m
Hˆf˜m
) 1.33 1.31
Female ser market to home ratio (
Hf˜s
Hˆf˜s
) 0.5 0.5
Ratio of agr income to man income (Ya/Ym) 1.0e-04 0.10
Ratio of man income to ser income (Ym/Ys) 0.16 0.16
Ratio of agr income to ser income (Ya/Ys) 1.6e-05 0.64
(wkswork2) for each individual and sum them up to find the annual total working
hours. Combined with the industrial classification defined in section 2.2, I calculated
the total working hours in each industry and found the shares. According to this, we
see an expansion in the service sector, while there is a shrinkage in agricultural and
manufacturing sector. Same trend prevails when we look at these shares by gender
except the agriculture share for female workers increase.
Similarly, I calculate the sectoral shares of home production as well as its gender
components using time use surveys. The classification of each sector is explained in
section 2.2. I sum annual sectoral hours and leisure time up to find the total hours at
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Table 2.5: Sectoral Shares in the Market
Year Shares
Year Agriculture Manufacture Service
1965 3.42 37.57 59
2012 2.55 20.5 76.94
Female
Year Agriculture Manufacture Service
1965 0.55 24.88 74.57
2012 1.28 9.49 89.23
Male
Year Agriculture Manufacture Service
1965 4.68 43.1 52.22
2012 3.55 29.1 67.4
Source:IPUMS-USA
home. I exclude sleeping time from my calculations. Table 2.6 displays the industrial
shares of home hours as well as shares for each gender. As expected, service share
constitutes the biggest share and it is dominated by women. Moreover, agricultural
and manufacturing sectoral shares are decreasing over the years while service shares
are increasing.
Table 2.7 displays the fraction of market and home hours both for female and
male workers. According to this, there is a decrease in both home and market hours
for female workers where as male home hours increase.
Data on market shares and work fraction in tables 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 can be combined
to characterize the full time allocation for each gender. Let Mg be the total market
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Table 2.6: Sectoral Shares at Home
Year Shares
Year Agriculture Manufacture Service
1965 1.09 25.76 73.14
2012 0.78 22.83 76.38
Female
Year Agriculture Manufacture Service
1965 0.97 11.04 87.99
2012 0.37 8.28 91.35
Male
Year Agriculture Manufacture Service
1965 1.19 37.95 60.85
2012 1.12 34.93 63.94
Source:IPUMS-USA
Table 2.7: Market and Home Fraction of Total Hours
Year Market Fraction Home Fraction
Female Male Female Male
1965 32.82 38.79 55.45 45.54
2012 26.81 30.57 51.7 46.9
Source:MTUS
43
work of gender g and Mˆg be the total house work of gender g. Also, let sgj and sˆgj
be the share of market work for each gender g and each sector j at market and home
respectively. These shares are calculated as the ratio of sectoral annual working hours
to the total annual working hours for each gender. Hence
∑
j sgj = 1 ∀g ∈ G =
{f˜ , m˜}.
Hgj
H¯g
=
Mg
H¯g
sgj ∀sgj, g ∈ {f˜ , m˜}, j ∈ {a,m, s}
Hˆgj
H¯g
=
Mˆg
H¯g
sˆgj ∀sˆgj, g ∈ {f˜ , m˜}, j ∈ {a,m, s}
Lg
H¯g
= 1− Mg + Mˆg
H¯g
∀g
The complete time allocation is on Table 2.8. According to this, we observe a
tremendous increase in home service hours for females as opposed to males. Female
workers market hours also decrease as they allocate more of their time to home
production and leisure.
Lastly, table 2.9 refers to gender wage ratio from 1965 to 2012. We observe that
the gender wage ratio fluctuates over the years while following an increasing trend.
2.5.2 Calibration Procedure
Aguiar et al. (2011) analyze business cycle version of Benhabib et al. (2011)
model to analyze how the forgone market hours are allocated across home production
activities using ATUS data. According to their paper, the model version excludes
sleep, eating, and personal care as leisure activities, an elasticity of approximately 2
2.5 produces a reallocation of market hours to home hours in the model that matches
the actual behavior of households in the data at business cycle frequencies. When
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Table 2.8: Complete Time Allocation
Female
Home Market
Time Agr. Man. Ser. Agr. Man. Ser. Leisure
1965 0.54 6.12 48.79 1.72 5.85 25.25 11.73
2012 0.19 4.28 91.35 0.28 4.75 21.78 21.49
Male
Home Market
Time Agr. Man. Ser. Agr. Man. Ser. Leisure
1965 0.54 17.28 27.71 10.39 9.85 18.55 15.67
2012 0.53 16.38 29.99 1.09 10.26 19.22 22.52
Source:Time Use Surveys and IPUMS-USA
Table 2.9: Wage Ratio
Year Wage Ratio
1965 49.45
2012 72
Source:IPUMS-USA
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we include these activities as leisure time activities, then the parameter is estimated
to be around 3.5-4. As my model excludes sleep, eating, and personal care from the
leisure time activities, I decide to use 2.5. Hence 2.5 = 1
1− which leads  = 0.6.
Ngai and Pissarides (2008) interpret − 1
1−θ as the own price elasticity in a model
without a home production because relative prices are inversely related to relative
TFP levels. However, with home production, the estimated own price elasticity should
be higher than − 1
1−θ in absolute value because some market-produced goods have
good home-produced substitutes. Given this, Falvey and Gemmell (1996) estimate
income and price elasticity of service demand using Phase IV ICP data set which
includes 60 countries. They find that the own price elasticity is −0.3 (Table 3, column
1). They compare their findings with Summers (1986) which estimates the same
elasticity as −0.06 which is close to Blundell et al. (1993), −0.07. Lastly, Herrendorf
et al. (2013) suggest if the technology is specified as value-added production function,
then consistency dictates that each argument in the utility function is the value-added
components of the utility function. This approach is called the consumption value-
added approach and this is the aproach I take in my model too. For this approach.
they estimated the elasticity of substitution between different composite goods equal
to 0.002 (Table 3 at Herrendorf et al. (2013)) . Hence, the elasticity of substitution
seems to vary between 0 and 0.3 for 1
1−θ . This means the θ ∈ [− inf,−2.33]. In my
analysis, I used θ = −5.76 as it seems to give better results.
Labor productivity growth for market agricultural sector is taken from US Depart-
ment of Agriculture (USDA). I defined labor productivity as the ratio of total output
to total number of labors by taking 2005 as the base year. I calculate the average
growth rate from 1948 to 1998 as 1948 is the earliest data available. The reason I
change the ending year to 1998 is to span 50 − year time period. My calculations
yield 4.16 percent growth in market agricultural sector. Similarly, labor productivity
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growth for market manufacturing and service sectors are taken from Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) delivering 3.11 percent growth in manufacturing sector whereas 2.42
percent growth in service sector.
Data for the home productivity data is taken from Bridgman (2016). He calcu-
lates annual home production output and productivity levels from 1929 to 2010. As
he takes the home production as one single entity, he naturally calculates one pro-
ductivity growth. Hence, I used the same labor productivity level for three sectors
which is 1.96 percent.
Lastly, I borrowed the values for sectoral shares of composite goods in aggregate
consumption from Herrendorf et al. (2013). According to them, κa = 0.02, κm = 0.17
and κs = 0.81. The parameter µ which represents the household’s preferences over
consumption and leisure is chosen to be 0.6 due to Ngai and Petrongolo (2014).
2.5.3 Calibrated Parameters
The relative time endowment H¯m˜
H¯f˜
is equated to be 1. In previus calculations, I
follow Ngai and Petrongolo (2014) and find it through service employment share. The
service share in the model can be expressed as follows:
s =
sˆm˜s
Mm˜
H¯m˜
H¯m˜
H¯f˜
+ sˆf˜s
H¯m˜
H¯f˜
Mm˜
H¯f˜
H¯f˜
H¯m˜
+
Mf˜
H¯f˜
(2.43)
From here, the relative time endowment can be expressed as follows:
H¯m˜
H¯f˜
=
(sf˜s − ss)
Mf˜
H¯f˜
(sm˜s − ss)Mm˜H¯m˜
(2.44)
The implied ratio is 1.94. This is rather higher than what it is usually expected.
Hence, I decide to go with 1 although it is not playing a prominent role on the shape
of female LFP.
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Using equations (2.22) and (2.23), the elasticity parameters η and ηl are set to
match the changes in log wage ratio and the changes in hours ration between beginning
and the end of the period.
η = 1−

log
 Hm˜jHf˜j t=0
Hm˜j
H
f˜j
t=T

log( x
0
XT
)

−1
As a result, η = −0.2 and ηl = 2.5. η < 0 means female and male labor supply
are complements. This results contradicts with papers close to my model. However,
the complementarity of male and female labor supply is not new in the literature.
As for the ηl > 0, it implies that male and female leisure is substitutes which is
rather controversial. Many studies show that couples take retirement or volunteering
decisions together and prefer to do these together which implies male and female
leisure time are complements (Goux et al. (2014), Rotolo and Wilson (2006), Connelly
and Kimmel (2009), Gustman and Steinmeier (2000)). On the other hand, in the
added worker effect literature, studies shows a substitution between male and female
labor supply when women tend to increase their labor supply when the husband lose
his job (Lundberg (1985), Gruber and Cullen (1996)). These findings implies that
husband and wife leisure times are substitutes. My calculations are in line with this
literature.
Given these values, the gender parameters ξj, ξˆj and ξl are also calculated using
equations (2.21) and (2.23). At this stage, I equate ξ = ξˆj ∀j to be consistent
with my assumptions in section 2.4. Given ξs, I calculate the comparative advantage
parameters αj using αj =
ξj
1−ξj . The calculated values for ξj are 0.85, 0.16 and 0.97
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respectively for a,m, s. Hence, women have higher comparative advantage in service
sector in the market where as lowest comparative advantage in manufacture sector.
Lastly, by equation 2.34, I calculate the market shares of each goods which are
ψ′js.
ψj
1− ψj =
(
Hˆf˜j
Hf˜j
)−1
(
Aˆj
Aj
)
To be comparable with the relevant literature, I enrich my model in Section 2.4
by introducing TFP growth rate to gender specific variables ξj for service sector and
manufacturing sector as in Ngai and Petrongolo (2014). This change increases the
labor force participation on the right a little more. This result is expected as as
women have higher comparative advantage compared to men, the demand for female
workers increase and that increases their labor force participation. However, as this
change in the labor force participation is not drastic, I did not include this in my
original analysis.
2.6 Results
As it is established in the previous sections, the movement of female labor force
participation depends on 3 important factors: Marketization, structural transforma-
tion and leisure-work choices. If the structural transformation dominates the other
two factors, this will induce a decrease while if marketization and leisure-work choice
dominates structural transformation, this induces an increase in the female labor
supply.
In the following exercise, I introduce different frowth rates to the model sectors
to analyze under what circumstances, the model produces increasing and decreas-
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ing trend. It should be noted that, for this experimental part, I do not change the
calibrated parameters. Hence, the market share of sectors or the composite commodi-
ties are always the same. Also, the calibration already induces a higher comparative
advantage for service sector for women while a lower comparative advantage in agri-
cultural sector. Given these values, I think testing how powerful the model is to
create increasing and decreasing trends is important.
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Figure 2.3: Female LFP between 1965-2012
Figure 2.3 displays how female lfp for the US moves with the labor productivity
growth rates in the data. Dotted line shows the US data for female LFP whereas the
solid line is the model outcome. According to data, agricultural technology grows at
the rate 3.19, manufacturing grows at the rate 3.11 and lastly service sector grows
at the rate of 2.42. Home technology is assumed to be growing at the rate of 1.94.
Given these rates, the labor force participation follows an increasing trend and it
actually increase by 26 percent between 1965 and 2012. On the other hand, female
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LFP increases by 40 percent between these years. Although there is a lot of room to
improve, the model is strong enough to produce an increasing trend.
This result is in line with the literature which argues the rise of service economy
and increasing female labor supply. With the developing service economy, more and
more women joins the labor supply through marketization or increases their labor
allocation by forgoing their leisure.
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Figure 2.4: Female LFP between 1965-2012
Furthermore, I investigate the decreasing part of the female labor supply by in-
troducing 30 percent growth rate for agriculture production, 13 percent growth rate
for manufacturing and 2 percent growth rate for service sector. The home tech-
nology growth is still 1.94 for all the sectors. Given these, high technology growth
in agriculture should lead a decrease in labor force participation as the structural
transformation will dominate. Figure 2.4 displays my result about this experiment.
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The first jump in Figure 2.4 is because the growth rates are introduced after the
first period (decade). According to this, high technology growth in agriculture com-
bined with low manufacturing and service sector leads to a decrease in labor supply.
This means the structural transformation dominates the other two important factors.
This result is also in line with the literature which argues structural transformation
in the early industrial revolution causes a decrease in female labor supply.
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Figure 2.5: Female LFP - Selected Countries
Given these important experimental results, I test if the model can generate the U-
shape trend observed in Figure 2.1. I choose 9 countries which are very close to fitted
line. Next, I introduce their productivity levels to my model. Finally, I analyze if the
given productivity levels together with calibrated parameters above can generate a
U-shape female lfp. Figure 2.5 displays the results.
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper develops a general equilibrium model to generate the U-shaped female
labor force participation. Theoretical results suggest that a rise in the service sector
increases the female LFP as it drives people from home to market work. On the
other hand, a higher technological growth in agricultural sector compared to manu-
facturing and service sector can cause a decrease in female LFP as it will decrease the
demand for labor. Quantitative results confirm the findings although there is room
for improvements.
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Chapter 3
COMPARING EQUILIBRIA IN DYNAMIC MODELS WITH NON-SEPARABLE
UTILITIES AND INDETERMINACIES
3.1 Introduction
Equilibrium comparative statics has been a focal question in dynamic general
equilibrium theory. To conduct comparative statics, one has to prove existence of
equilibrium. Per existence and computation of equilibria, if the welfare theorems
hold i.e the model is Pareto optimal, we use methods such as Negishi (1960) to verify
the existence and then, apply some fixed point algorithms such as Scarf algorithm
or global Newton method to compute the equilibria. However, when it comes to
non Pareto optimal (equivalently nonoptimal) economies such as economies with dis-
tortionary taxation policies, production externalities and various monetary policies;
usual methods do not generally work as the welfare theorems fail.
Great deal of work has been devoted to find a new methodology for proving and
computing the existence of equilibrium in nonoptimal recursive equilibrium theory.
For example, Coleman II (1997), Greenwood and Huffman (1995) apply monotone
mapping methodology to prove existence on environments with elastic labor supply1.
The methodology refers to a monotone operator whose fixed points define the recursive
equilibrium. It is a very powerful tool for this environment but given the conditions
on preferences and technology, it is quite hard to apply the proposed methodology to
1The methodology is developed by Lucas Jr and Stokey (1985) and Coleman (1991)
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various important applied general equilibrium problems (Datta et al. (2002)).23 For
example, the models with monetary policies such as Cooley and Hansen (1989), Cole
et al. (1998) are ones of these environments. In this paper, I extend the monotone
mapping model in such a way that it will be applicable to a larger set of applied
environments.
Another issue in these nonoptimal economies is that indeterminacy (multiple equi-
libria) is inherent in many of these dynamic models. Since Kareken and Wallace
(1981), economists determine the conditions at which the economy has indetermi-
nacy of equilibria. For example, Benhabib and Farmer (1994) examine the properties
of one sector growth model with increasing returns. For increasing returns, they con-
sider two organizational structure one of which is aggregate input externalities while
the other is monopolistic competition. Under commonly used parameters in business
cycle literature, they show that there is indeterminacy of equilibria. Similarly, Nourry
et al. (2013) investigates the role of consumption tax on aggregate (in)stability.4 For
2 In Coleman II (1997), the production function is assumed to be F (x, n, KN , s) where x and n are
individual firm’s capital and labor decisions and K/N is the ratio of aggregate capital to aggregate
labor supply and s is the productivity shock. This leads wage rate and rental rate to be a function
of K/N which is quite restrictive. In my paper, I exclude this assumption and use a more general
form of a production function.
3 In Greenwood and Huffman (1995), the utility function is assumed to be in the following form:
u(c, l) = h(c − g(l)) where h(.) is monotone increasing and g(l) is concave function. This is to say
that the marginal rate of substitution of consumption to leisure is independent of consumption. As I
find it restrictive, I define a more general form of utility function to span a greater applied literature.
4Consumption taxation has two effect on household decisions. One of which is consumption tax
decreases the relative price of leisure. This leads to lower consumption and labor supply. This is what
is called as intratemporal substitution effect and causes aggregate instability. On the other hand,
higher consumption tax makes consumption good more expensive. Hence, household may increase
the labor supply to smooth consumption. This mechanism is named as intratemporal income effect.
Nourry et.al. are mainly interested in examining these two opposing effects of consumption tax on
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that,they examine a one sector growth models with nonlinear consumption tax and
with a specification of preferences. This specification entails them to span varying
degrees of income effect depending on the choice of parameters 5. They find that
for a big set of parameters, consumption taxation can be a source of indeterminacy
in most of the OECD countries. Other important papers on this are Bennett and
Farmer (2000), Miao and Santos (2005), Nishimura and Venditti (2002) and some
observationally equivalent models in such as Liu and Wang (2014) which talks about
credit constraints. Hence, indeterminacy is very common phenomena in most of the
well known applied models.
Awareness of indeterminacy in a model is important for two reasons. First, from
a practical point of view, calibration and estimation results are difficult to interpret.
In order to fully understand how the economy behaves in response to a policy change
for instance, we need to be aware of which exact equilibrium we are talking about.
If the economist is not aware that there is multiplicity, then she will not know that
depending on the parameter space she chooses, her results are going to vary. Hence,
the results are going to be ’parameter-biased’. For example, assume an economist has
aggregate instability. As intratemporal income effect has a stabilizing effect, they want to see how
varying degrees of income effect can dominate the instabilizing effect of intratemporal substitution
effect.
5The specification in question is a form of utility function.
u(c, l) =
[
c− (1−l)1+χ1+χ cγ
]1−θ
− 1
1− θ
This utility is the one which is derived in Jaimovich (2008) to encompass varying degrees of income
effect. With this kind of utility function, we will be able to generalize our results to a wide range of
cases from no-income effect to constant income effect. In fact when γ = 0 it belongs to no income
effect which we know from Greenwood et al. (1988) whereas when γ = 1, it belongs to large income
effect with endogenous growth which we know from King et al. (1988).
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a growth model with multiple equilibria of which she is not aware. With the parameter
space she uses, let’s say there are three different equilibria but she is only aware of
the least equilibrium of those three. Normally, when you have multiple equilibria,
comparing equilibrium points would be meaningful if you compare the equilibriums in
the same class. For instance, comparing the least point with the new least equilibrium
is meaningful but comparing the least point with the greatest new equilibrium is
not. Hence, once she perturbs some of the parameters, if she luckily jumps to the
least point of the new set of equilibria, she can make some meaningful comparisons
with these two points. On the other hand, if she jumps to the greatest point of
the new equilibria, whatever conclusion she reaches will not mean anything. Hence,
awareness of indeterminacy is crucial. While going through the indeterminacy papers
in the literature, I realize that almost all the papers look for the set of parameters
that create indeterminacy. They do not offer how to prove or compute the existence.
However, in order to derive valuable implications, one should know not only one set
of parameters which create multiplicity, but also compute the whole equilibria so that
no matter what the parameter set is, she could have some idea about how the model
behaves. Focusing our attention to recursive competitive economies, Coleman II
(1997), Greenwood and Huffman (1995) prove the existence of equilibria. However,
as mentioned in the footnote 2 and 3 the conditions on preferences and production
technologies are so strong that it is hard to apply the methods on various applied
problems. Besides, none of the models offer a method to compute the equilibria.
Hence, the first contribution of this paper is to provide a methodology for proving and
computing the recursive equilibrium in case of indeterminacy with weaker conditions
on preferences and technology.
Second, from a theoretical point of view, presence of multiple equilibria generates
complications for equilibrium comparisons. When an economist has multiple equilib-
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ria, she should know which particular equilibrium she is analyzing, as each equilibrium
may behave differently in case of a perturbation of a parameter of the model. When
dynamic economies were Pareto optimal and agents were homogeneous; convexity of
preferred sets, smoothness of indifference curves with standard Inada conditions for
interiority led us to unique recursive equilibrium. In that case, we could derive the
local comparative statics predictions by applying implicit function theorem or lattice
programming techniques.
However, in nonpareto optimal economies which I will be working in this paper, I
do not have any smoothness so implicit function theorem is not applicable. Moreover,
usual lattice programming techniques do not also work here because the multiplicity
simply deteriorates the single crossing property of the objective function. Hence, we
cannot use lattice programming for equilibrium comparative statics. This is what
leads us to seek for a new robust comparative statics methodology in case of mul-
tiplicity. Keeping our attention to recursive environments, there are several studies
on these such as Acemoglu and Jensen (2015) andMirman et al. (2008). All provide
powerful tools to deal with this issue. Especially, if the model is a dynamic economy
with inelastic labor supply, small capital externalities with no labor externality, we
can obtain robust comparative statics predictions. However, they are also far away
from providing a solution if we have elastic labor supply, labor externalities or large
capital externalities which are also commonly used in applied economics literature.
Therefore, the second contribution of this paper is to provide a methodology for these
kind of economies.
Hence, in this paper I apply a new method to verify and compute the existence
of recursive equilibrium in dynamic economies with capital accumulation and elastic
labor supply. I also provide the robust equilibrium comparative statics in various
sub-classes of equilibria as well as comparative dynamics in a particular subclass of
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equilibria i.e recursive equilibria with monotone investment process. The method
is multi-step monotone mapping methodology which is based on operator equations
defined in partially ordered sets and characterizing a particular subclass of recur-
sive equilibrium over both individual and aggregate state variables at each step of
computation.6
I apply this method to the class of models which can be categorized as ”dy-
namic models with complementarities”. Economies with externalities/nonconvexities
in production, public policy such as distortional taxation, monopolistic competition
and monetary economies can be cast into this framework. All of these models are also
non-pareto optimal economies which is another reason of why classical methods for
computing equilibria and providing comparative statics predictions do not work. The
reason for that is the classical methods used in Pareto optimal case benefits from the
welfare theorems. When the economy is nonoptimal, none of the welfare theorems do
not work. For more interested readers, I also talk about the usual methods used in
Pareto optimal case in section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.
Hence, when we have Pareto optimal economy, social welfare theorems play an
important role in both computing existence of equilibrium and comparative statics.
However, in a nonpareto optimal economy, none of these methods work because wel-
fare theorems are literally useless. Considering the fact that the class of nonoptimal
economies includes a very large portion of recursive competitive equilibrium models
studied extensively in the literature, it is important to have a theoretical framework
for both existence and comparative statics.
6Monotone mapping approach was pioneered in the seminal works of Coleman (1991), Coleman II
(1997), Coleman II (2000). Multi-step monotone mapping methodology was first developed by Datta
et al. (2002).
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Having a theoretical framework is basically essential for two reasons. From the
theoretical point of view, it fills in a significant gap in the literature. The literature
on existence of recursive equilibria in nonpareto optimal economies is still weak as
almost all the papers, to my knowledge, are based on numerical solutions or the ones
which proves existence offer strong assumptions (Coleman II (1997), Greenwood and
Huffman (1995)). Similarly, comparative statics literature (Acemoglu and Jensen
(2015) and Mirman et al. (2008) etc.) does not cover very important models such as
the ones with elastic labor supply, or labor externalities or large capital externalities.
From the practical point of view, it gives the economist a broader perspective about
the economy she modeled. With a well-defined theoretical framework, it will be easier
to interpret whether there is multiplicity, or how the economy behaves in response to a
parameter change etc. Hence, providing a theoretical framework have both theoretical
and practical benefits.
The basic idea behind this multi-step monotone mapping methodology is that as
the welfare theorems do not work, I turn the problem into a fixed point problem to
talk about existence and do comparative statics. In the first step, I define two ’side
conditions’ for consumption and leisure decisions. These conditions can be obtained
by Lagrange equation for household utility maximization problem. These side condi-
tions are important in the sense that they help me to find intratemporal consumption
and leisure decisions through a fixed point problem. Note that the consumption and
leisure equations in this step are not recursive equilibrium consumption and leisure
decisions. They are basically functions of aggregate state variable, inverse marginal
utility and exogenous shock parameter but they will help me to find the recursive
equilibrium consumption and leisure decisions in the second step. Furthermore, first
step calculations help me to see if there is any multiplicity due to production exter-
nality. Once I determine the multiplicity, I provide robust comparative statistics for
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the least and greatest consumption and leisure decisions. The equilibrium compar-
ative statics I obtain in this step will be robust in any subclasses of equilibria. To
summarize, the first step computation characterizes all the necessary and sufficient
conditions to verify the existence of recursive equilibrium for any given aggregate
state.
In the second step, I carry these intratemporal equations into a dynamic envi-
ronment by simply introducing the evolution of aggregate state variable. It is this
step where I start to use household’s Euler equation to find recursive equilibrium
consumption, investment and leisure decisions. As I do in the first step, I again solve
a fixed point problem to find recursive competitive consumption and leisure decisions.
In the second step, I will mainly be interested in a particular subclass of equilibrium
at which the investment is monotone in current capital stock. Hence, equilibrium
comparative dynamics will be specific to this subclass.
3.1.1 Proving and Computing Equilibrium in PO Economies
To motivate the contribution of this paper more, It is important to mention the
usual methodologies used in case of Pareto optimality.
As mentioned above, in case of Pareto optimality, verifying and computing ex-
istence and getting some comparative statics predictions could be done by usual
methods. For example, consider a one sector growth model with finite number of
infinitely lived, homogeneous households. Using Negishi’s approach, we could prove
the existence of equilibrium as the solutions to social planning problem because we
already know that the economy is Pareto optimal and welfare theorems hold. Set up
a social planner’s problem with strictly positive welfare weights for each individual.
With the help of welfare weights, the set of all Pareto optimal solutions could be
defined. By first welfare theorem we know that the competitive equilibrium must be
61
Pareto optimal. Then, the question of finding competitive equilibrium out of this
set comes down to applying second welfare theorem. As nicely explained by Kehoe
(1991), a price-allocation pair is equilibrium if and only if there exists a strictly posi-
tive positive vector of welfare weights such that proposed allocation solves the social
planner’s problem and the price vector is the corresponding vector of Lagrange mul-
tipliers with zero-sum transfers. Negishi (1960) proves the existence of such welfare
weights. Hence, this method would take care of the existence of recursive competitive
equilibrium if we had Pareto optimal economy.
When it comes to computing equilibrium, we would need some additional algo-
rithms. Uzawa (1962) states that any algorithm which computes the equilibrium of
an arbitrary equilibrium in terms of excess demand functions should also compute
the fixed points of an arbitrary mapping of a simplex into itself. Based on this idea,
Scarf (1967) Scarf and Hansen (1973) Scarf (1982) developed such an algorithm which
has been used to find the equilibrium of an economy via a fixed point problem. His
idea is based on Sperner’s Lemma: Divide a simplex S into subsimplices. Assign
every vertex of these simplices a label from {1, 2, ..., n} where n < ∞ in such a way
that a vertex v on the boundary of S is labeled with i for which vi = 0. For finding
the fixed point, start in the corner of a S where there is a subsimplex labeled with
{2, ..., n}. Move from this subsimplex to another which have the same labels. When
the next subsimplex we move have the label 1, the algorithm stops. Scarf argues that
the algorithm must terminate with a subsimplex whose vertices have all the labels
{1, 2, ..., n} because the there are finite number of subdivisions. The point where
the algorithm stops is the fixed point a.k.a. the equilibrium of the economy. More
precisely, after finding all the Pareto optimal allocations and proving the existence
by Negishi method, if we apply this algorithm to a price simplex, the price where the
algorithm stops would be our competitive equilibrium price system.
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3.1.2 Comparative Statics in Pareto Optimal Economies
Lastly, comparative statics predictions could also be obtained in case of Pareto
optimality. For a global comparative statics prediction, we could use Lattice pro-
gramming. For example, assume it is a growth model which social planner chooses
investment level and we are interested how investment behaves in response to changes
in discount parameter which is commonly denoted by β in most of the models. As-
suming that the model satisfies all the necessary conditions for the existence of a value
function, we check if the value function is supermodular in investment and satisfies
increasing differences in investment and discount factor. If both conditions hold, we
say, by Veinott (1992) or Topkis (1978), the investment is monotone in β. On the
other hand, if local predictions were sought, we could use implicit function theorem on
first order conditions or envelope theorem on value functions. As mentioned above,
there are certain conditions to be satisfied for these methods such as convexity of
preferred sets, smoothness of the functions, convexity of the objective function and
interiority so we should check them. In general, when we have Pareto optimality,
comparative statics results could be obtained through usual methods.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section, I set up the basic one sector
growth model with elastic labor supply. In Section 3.3, conditions for existence of
recursive equilibrium is provided and proved. In Section 3.4, I characterize the theory
of robust comparative statics. Finally, section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Setup and Primitives
The model is a dynamic general equilibrium model with production externali-
ties and complementarities. The production function is adapted from Benhabib and
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Farmer (1994). In its reduced-form, production structure covers many models in the
literature with multiple sequential equilibria such as the models with distortionary
taxes, externalities and monopolistic competition.
Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ T = {0, 1, 2, ...}. The economy has a contin-
uum of identical infinitely-lived household/firm agents with nonseparable preferences
within each period. The preferences are over consumption and leisure and time sepa-
rable over lifetime streams of these goods. I assume that each household is endowed
with one unit of time and enters into a period with an individual capital stock k ∈ K
where K ⊂ R+ is a compact order interval and convex subset of R+. Households own
the firms as well as both factors of production which are capital and labor. They rent
these factors to competitive firms and enjoy the income out of these rents.
The firm technology F (k, n,K,N, θ) is constant returns to scale in private inputs
of capital k and labor n, and also is subject to positive externalities due to aggregate
capital K and labor N . The productivity shock θ ∈ Θ is exogenous and follows a
first order Markov process with stationary transition matrix χ(θ, dθ
′
). For simplicity,
assume that the state space for the shock Θ is a finite set. Also, throughout the paper
I will denote the next period variables with prime .′.
To elaborate more on production externalities, one can interpret capital external
effects as knowledge. When a firm creates a new knowledge via R&D activities, it
will have a positive external effect on the production possibilities of other firms. The
reason is that knowledge cannot be perfectly kept as a secret due to spillover effects
7. On the other hand, labor external effects can be attributed to the thick market
externalities. In boom times, for instance, there are many firms and labors in the
market which is described as thick market. In a thick market, as workers exert more
7Production externality is first introduced by Romer (1986). Production externality has been
one of the fundamental pillars in endogenous growth literature after Romer’s seminal paper.
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search effort to find a job, the employment rate will rise. On the other hand, it will
be more easy for a firm to match with a worker so the production costs will fall. As
a result, more workers in the market lead to positive externality on the production of
individual firms.
For each period t and state (k, θ), households choose how much to consume and
save, as well as how they allocate their one unit of time between leisure l and work
n. Households’ lifetime preferences are time seperable, there is constant discounting
at rate β ∈ (0, 1), with period preferences represented by u(ct, lt) where (c, l) ∈
R+ × [0, 1]. Therefore, lifetime preferences for a typical household are given by:
U(c, l) = E0
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, lt)
}
(3.1)
where the expectation operator comes from the probability structure of the stochas-
tic productivity shock induced by the Markov process χ(θ, dθ
′
).
I make the following baseline assumption on preferences and technologies through-
out the paper:
Assumption 1 (i) The period utility function is supermodular, bounded above,
C2, strictly increasing, strictly concave in (c, l) satisfies the following Inada conditions:
lim
c→0
u1(c, l) = ∞ (3.2)
lim
c→∞
u1(c, l) = 0 (3.3)
lim
l→0
u2(c, l) = ∞ (3.4)
lim
l→1
u2(c, l) > 0 (3.5)
(ii) Further, we assume that
lim
l→1
u1(c, l) > 0 for all c > 0
(iii) The production function F (k, n,K,N, θ) = f(k, n, θ) · e(K,N) is jointly C2,
strictly increasing and supermodular in all arguments, such that private returns f :
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K× [0, 1]×Θ→ R+ is constant returns to scale (CRS, hereafter) and strictly concave
in (k, n), and social externality function e : K × [0, 1] → R+ is strictly increasing
in both arguments. We also assume F (k, n,K,N, θ) satisfies the following Inada
conditions for all (K,N, θ) > 0:
lim
k→0
F1(k, n,K,N, θ) = ∞ for all n > 0
lim
k→∞
F1(k, n,K,N, θ) = 0 for all n > 0
lim
n→0
F2(k, n,K,N, θ) = ∞ for all k > 0
(iv) Moreover, we assume that
lim
n→0
fn(k, n, θ)e(k, n) = 0
First, by Assumption 1(i), as the utility function is increasing in l and concave,
labor supply curve is upward sloping. Second, Assumption 1(ii) and Inada condition
(3.5) imply that when individual decide not to work, the wage rate is still positive.
Therefore, labor supply curve has a positive intercept. Lastly, Assumption 1(iv) guar-
antees that for 0 < n < 1 which is sufficiently small, labor demand curve is initially
below the labor supply curve and that there will be even number of intersections
between labor supply and labor demand curves. Hence, there will be Euler equation
branching whenever there is multiplicity of equilibria. This assumption is important
to prove continuity of labor supply which I do in Lemma 3.3.2.
Assumption 2 Second partial order derivatives of the utility function satisfy the
following conditions:
u11
u1
≤ u21
u2
,
u22
u2
≤ u12
u1
(3.6)
which is normality assumption. It means that marginal rate of substitution u2
u1
(c, l)
is increasing in c and decreasing in l.
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3.2.2 Firm’s Problem
We now construct the firm’s problem in a recursive equilibrium. Firms solve a
static profit maximization problem. Representative firm maximizes profit by choosing
capital k and labor demand n. Define the firm’s profit function Π : R+ × R+ ×K×
[0, 1]×Θ→ R+ such that
Π(R,w,K,N, θ) = max
k∈K,n∈[0,1]
F (k, n,K,N, θ)−R(K,N, θ)k − w(K,N, θ)n
where R = R(K,N, θ) and w = w(K,N, θ).
Under Assumption 1(ii), the production function is continuous. Hence the ob-
jective function is continuous whereas the constraint set is nonempty and compact.
Then, by Weierstrass Theorem, there exists an optimal solution to this maximization
problem.
By definition of recursive competitive equilibrium, the equilibrium factor prices
along recursive equilibrium path is defined where k = K,n = N for each θ. Hence,
the equilibrium prices are as follows:
R(K,N, θ) = f1(K,N, θ) · e(K,N) (3.7)
w(K,N, θ) = f2(K,N, θ) · e(K,N) (3.8)
Hence, given any law of motion for aggregate state variables, such as K ′ = g(K, θ),
as well as a continuous function for equilibrium labor supply N(K, θ) one can derive
sequential equilibrium factor prices given any set of initial conditions (K0, θ0) >> 0.
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3.2.3 Household’s Problem
Assume N(K, θ) is continuous function of aggregate state variables by zero profit
condition under CRS such that ∀(K, θ), where K > 0, N(K, θ) ∈ [0, 1]. Then the
household’s income process each period is as follows:
y(k, n,K,N, θ) = R(K,N(K, θ), θ)k + w(K,N(K, θ), θ)n+ (1− δ)k + Π
Here δ stands for the depreciation rate of the capital.
I define the household’s budget set as follows:
Γ(s;N) = {(c, l)| c+ k′ ≤ y(k, n,K,N, θ), c ≥ 0, k′ ∈ K, l ∈ [0, 1]} (3.9)
where I use ′ to indicate the variables next period.
Under assumption 1(iii), because the production function is strictly concave and
continuous, the budget constraint set is non-empty, compact, convex and continuous.
We now construct a dynamic programming representation of the household’s se-
quential problem. The state space for household’s dynamic program is denoted by
s = (k,K, θ) ∈ S = K × K × Θ. Give S its componentwise partial order. Then, the
minimal state space for the economy is a subspace of S. I denote this minimal state
space as S = D ×Θ where D is the diagonal of K×K:
S = D ×Θ = {(K, θ) ∈ S | s = (K,K, θ), (K,K) ∈ D,K ∈ K}
Define Bf (S) to be the subset of the space of bounded functions that satisfies the
household budget constraint on a minimal state space s ∈ S:
Bf (S) = {c(K, θ), N(K, θ) | N(K, θ) ∈ (0, 1] when K > 0,K = (K,K) ∈ D,
0 ≤ c(K, θ) ≤ y(K, θ;N)} (3.10)
Note that, in minimal state space N(K, θ) = n(K,K, θ) and as the time endowment
of individual is 1, n = 1 − l as well as the aggregate labor supply N = 1 − L
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where L stands for the aggregate leisure time. Denote y(K,N(K, θ), K,N(K, θ), θ) =
y(K, θ;N) for notational ease. Therefore, the household assumes the following law of
motion for aggregate capital stock K:
K ′ = g(K, θ) = y(K, θ;N)− c(K, θ) such that (c(K, θ), N(K, θ)) ∈ Bf (S) (3.11)
Now, given the initial state variables (k0, K0, θ) >> 0, households calculate equilib-
rium prices by using (c(K, θ), N(K, θ)) from (k0, K0) >> 0. The state variables for the
household’s problem are s = (k,K, θ) ∈ S Then, the representative household solves
the following dynamic problem: given (c,N) ∈ Bf (S) with K ∈ K∗ = K−{0}, θ ∈ Θ,
we have g > 0, N > 0, the household’s value function V : K×K∗ ×Θ× Bf (S)→ R
satisfies the following parameterized Bellman equation:
V (s; c,N) = max
c,l
{u(c, l) + β
∑
θ′∈Θ
V (y(k, n,K,N, θ)− c, g(K, θ), θ; c(g, θ), l(g, θ))χ(θ, dθ′)}
(3.12)
where c ∈ [0, y(k, n,K,N, θ)] and l ∈ [0, 1] and n = 1− l.
Under Assumption 1(i) and (iii), given any aggregate policy function g(K, θ), and
so (c(K, θ), N(K, θ)) and a transition function χ(θ, θ′), there exists a unique value
function that satisfies (3.12). Moreover, the value function is strictly increasing, dif-
ferentiable and strictly concave in k. Further, it is already mentioned that household
budget set (3.9) is compact and convex. Then, in the light of Coleman (1991), I can
now define a monotone operator which maps into itself and the fixed point of this
operator will become the recursive competitive equilibrium of the economy. Thus,
the pair (c∗(k, θ), N∗(k, θ)) is a recursive equilibrium if and only if (c∗, N∗) solves the
following recursive equilibrium functional equation when k = K, θ ∈ Θ.
A∗(c∗(k, θ), N∗(k, θ))(k, k, θ) = (c∗(k, k, θ; c∗, l∗), n∗(k, k, θ; c∗, l∗)) (3.13)
= (c∗, n∗)(k, θ) , k = K > 0, ∀θ ∈ Θ
= 0, else
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where n∗(k, k, θ; c∗, N∗) = 1 − l∗(k, k, θ; c∗, N∗) and N∗(k, θ) = 1 − L∗(k, θ) in equi-
librium.
Formally, I define the recursive equilibrium as follows:
Definition 3.2.1 A minimal state space recursive equilibrium is pair of functions
(c∗(k, θ), N∗(k, θ)) ∈ Bf (S) such that each of them are strictly positive when k > 0
for all θ ∈ Θ and the value function v∗(k, k, θ; c∗, l∗) that solves (3.12) if they satisfy
the followings:
(i) given g∗(k, θ) = (y∗ − c∗)(k, θ;N∗) and aggregate labor supply N∗(k, θ), when
K = k > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ, the functions c(s; c∗, N∗), l(s; c∗, N∗) are optimal solutions of
the dynamic program in (3.12) with associated value function V (s; c∗(k, θ), N∗(k, θ))
(ii) the optimal solutions (c(s; c∗, N∗), l(s; c∗, N∗)) = (c∗(k, θ), l∗(k, θ)) ∈ Bf (S)
solve the necessary and sufficient fixed point problem in (3.13) if k = K > 0 and
(iii) (c(s; c∗, l∗), l(s; c∗, l∗)) = 0, else.
In the light of Stokey (1989) Theorem 9.8, because K ∈ R+ is a closed,convex
subset, Θ is a countable set under σ−algebra, the budget set Γ(s;N) in (3.9) is non-
empty, compact-valued, convex and continuous, utility function is bounded, strictly
concave and continuous under assumption 1(i), β ∈ (0, 1), the value function is
strictly concave. Hence, by Mirman and Zilcha (1975) Lemma 1, it is at least once
continuously differentiable in k.
Therefore, I can characterize the recursive equilibrium functional equation in
(3.13) by writing the Euler equation as well as the first order conditions governing
consumption and leisure decisions along the recursive equilibrium paths. Hence, the
optimal consumption c∗ = c∗(k, k, θ; c∗, N∗) and leisure decision l∗ = l∗(k, k, θ; c∗, N∗)
in any recursive equilibrium satisfy the following Euler equation given K = k > 0
and θ ∈ Θ. For simplicity, I denote c∗ = c∗(k, k, θ) and c∗(g∗, g∗, θ′; g∗(k, θ)) means
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consumption next period given the law of motion for aggregate state variable g∗(k, θ).
Same for the leisure decision.
Z∗(k, k, θ; c∗(k, θ), N∗(k, θ)) = −u1(c∗, l∗)
+β
∑
θ′∈Θ
u1(c
∗(g∗, g∗, θ′; g∗(k, θ)), l∗(g∗, g∗, θ′ ; g∗(k, θ)))
×f1(g∗(k, θ), (1− l∗(g∗, g∗, θ′; g∗(k, θ))), θ′)
×e(g∗(k, θ), 1− l∗(g∗(k, θ)))× χ(θ, θ′) (3.14)
Although it will be mathematically more clear in the next sections, it is important
to talk about the idea of multiplicity at this point. Normally, if this was a unique
equilibrium economy, I would expect Z∗ function to be monotonic with respect to
state variable k. Hence, the equilibrium investment level would be defined at the
point where Z∗ = 0. However, given the existence of externality, above Z∗ function
loses its monotonicity property and because of that, the function Z∗ may be equal to
zero at either finitely many times of within a continuum of points. Hence, I say that
there are multiple of equilibria.
Rather than working on this Euler equation to prove the existence and computing
equilibria, I start with the following two conditions which can be derived from the
dual formulation of the problem which is the Lagrange equation. These are the
relationships between consumption and leisure with Lagrange multiplier ( 1
m
) of the
dual formulation.
u1(c, l) =
1
m
(3.15)
u2(c, l) =
1
m
w (3.16)
Equation (3.15) is obtained by taking the first order condition of Lagrange equa-
tion with respect to c and equation (3.16) is obtained by taking the first order condi-
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tion with respect to l. Using (3.15) and (3.16), the equilibrium relationship between
the marginal rate of substitution and wage is given as follows:
u2(c, l)
u1(c, l)
= w(K,N,K,N, θ) (3.17)
Equation (3.17) shows that how many unit of time a consumer is willing to work
more to increase her consumption one more unit.
Equation (3.15) and (3.17) are basically the two side conditions I will be using
to define contingent recursive equilibrium of consumption and labor decisions as a
function of aggregate state variable, inverse marginal utility and productivity shock.
It is also this step, where I define all the necessary and sufficient conditions to verify
the existence of recursive equilibrium at any given aggregate state as well as providing
robust equilibrium comparative statics. Section 3.3.1 basically puts these ideas into
a mathematical structure.
3.3 Existence of Equilibrium
3.3.1 Solving Side Conditions
This section constructs the contingent decisions for consumption and leisure. The
equilibrium is contingent in the sense that they depend on the aggregate state vari-
ables which are (K, θ) and inverse marginal utility of consumption m.
Additionally, this section also provides comparative statics on contingent con-
sumption and leisure decisions. The comparative statics predictions are robust in the
sense that they are valid in every subclass of equilibria.
The analysis starts with constructing leisure decision under the following assump-
tion:
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Assumption 3 F (k, n,K,N, θ) is such that w(K,N, θ) = f2(K,N, θ)e(K,N) is
(i) (Small Labor Externality) decreasing in N
(ii) (Large Labor Externality) strictly increasing in N in equilibrium.
In equilibrium. there are two driving forces behind the movement of wage rate in
response to changes in labor supply in the economy. One of which is the concavity of
the production function and the other is the size of the externality in the economy.
One can see it from the following equation which is basically the derivative of wage
rate in response to labor supply:
F22(K,N,K,N, θ) = f22(K,N, θ)e(K,N) + f2(K,N, θ)e2(K,N) (3.18)
where the first term captures the curvature of the production function while the
second term captures the size of the externality. Now, under Assumption 1(iii),
when Assumption 3(i) holds, the concavity of the production technology dominates
the effect of the labor externality. Thus, I define it as small labor externality. On the
other hand, if Assumption 3(ii) holds, the second term in equation (3.18) outweighs
the first term. Hence, I define it as large labor externality.
In a candidate recursive equilibrium, K = k and L = l. Under small externality
assumption, take equation (3.17) and define the following mapping:
Z l1(l,K,C, θ) =
u2(C, l)
u1(C, l)
− w(K, 1− l, θ) (3.19)
Then, the leisure choice can be defined as
l∗1(K,C, θ) = {l|Z l1 = 0, C > 0}
= 0 if C = 0
When large externality is assumed, Z l1 mapping above would be insufficient to use
for computing equilibrium and providing comparative statics predictions. The reason
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is the mapping will lose its monotonic structure under large externality. Hence, I
define another mapping which lets me compute off-path leisure choice and obtain
comparative statics predictions for the least and greatest leisure decisions. Thus,
when K = k but L 6= l, define
Z l2(l,K,C, L, θ) =
u2(C, l)
u1(C, l)
− f2(K, 1− l)e(K, 1− L) (3.20)
Then,
l∗2(K,C,L, θ) = {l|Z l2 = 0, C > 0}
= 0 if C = 0
Lemma 3.3.1 (i) Under Assumption 1, 2 and 3(i), when l = L, there exist l∗1(K,C, θ)
that is unique and continuous (K,C, θ) and l∗1(K,C, θ) is increasing in C and decreas-
ing in K.
(ii) Under Assumption 1, 2, 3(ii), l∗2(K,C,L, θ) is well defined, increasing in
(L,C) and decreasing in K.
(iii) For fixed (K,C), when l 6= L, l∗2(L;K,C, θ) is an increasing transformation
of [0, 1]→ [0, 1]
(iv) Under Assumption 1, 2, 3(ii), if Ψ(K,C, θ) is the set of fixed points of
l∗2(L;K,C, θ), Ψ(K,C, θ) is a complete lattice with selections ∧Ψ(K,C, θ) = l∧(K,C, θ)
and ∨Ψ(K,C, θ) = l∨(K,C, θ) increasing in C and decreasing in K.
Proof 3.3.0.1 (i) Consider equation (3.19). First I show there exists a well-defined
l∗1(K,C, θ). By Assumption 2, the first term is decreasing in l. Further, by assumption
3(i), w(K, 1− l, θ) is strictly increasing in l. Then, Z l(l,K,C, θ) is strictly decreasing
in l.
Also, by Assumption 1(i), utility function satisfy Inada conditions so
lim
l→0
Z l(l,K,C, θ) =∞
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By Assumption 1(iii), production function satisfies Inada condition: as n goes to
0 (which equivalently says l goes to 1), marginal product of labor w(K, 1 − l, θ) goes
to ∞. Moreover, as n goes to 0, u2(C,l)
u1(C,l)
is finite. Then,
lim
l→1
Z l(l,K,C, θ) = −∞
Given continuity assumptions on utility function and prices, there exist a unique
l∗1(K,C, θ) which makes Z
l(l,K,C, θ) = 0.
Further, as the utility and production functions are assumed to be continuous under
assumptions 1(i) and 1(iii), l∗1(K,C, θ) is continuous.
Now, I need to show that l∗(K,C, θ) is increasing in C and decreasing in K.
By assumption 2, Z l(l,K, c, θ) is increasing in C so for any C ′ ≥ C where C,C ′ ∈
[0, y(k, n,K,N, θ)], Z l(l1(K,C, θ), K, C
′, θ) > Z l(l1(K,C, θ), K, C, θ) = 0. As
Z l(l,K,C, θ) is also strictly decreasing in l, l∗1(K,C
′, θ) ≥ l∗1(K,C, θ). Thus,
l∗1(K,C, θ) is increasing in C.
Further, by assumption 1(iii), production function is increasing in all arguments
so wage rate is increasing in K. Thus, Z l(l,K,C, θ) is decreasing in K. Together
with decreasing property of Z l(l,K,C, θ), we conclude that l∗1(K,C, θ) is decreasing in
K.
(ii) Consider equation (3.20). The first term of Z l is decreasing in l by Assump-
tion 2 and the second term is increasing in l by concavity assumption of f(k, n).
Thus, Z l is decreasing in l. It also satisfies the necessary Inada conditions by as-
sumptions 1(i) and 1(iii) so there exists a unique l∗2(K,C,L, θ). Hence, l
∗(K,C,L, θ)
is well-defined.
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Z l is increasing in L as e(K,N) is strictly increasing in both arguments by assump-
tion 1(iii). Then, for every L′ ≥ L where L′, L ∈ [0, 1], Z l(l∗2(K,C,L, θ), K, C, L′, θ) ≥
Z l(l∗2(K,C,L, θ), K, C, L, θ) = 0. As Z
l is decreasing in l,
l∗2(K,C,L
′, θ) ≥ l∗2(K,C,L, θ). Hence, it is increasing in L.
Similarly, by assumption 2, Z l is increasing in C. Hence, l∗2(c,K, L, θ) is increas-
ing in C.
Lastly, by Assumption 1(iii), as Z l is decreasing in K, so is l∗2(K,C,L, θ).
(iii) For fixed (K,C), l∗(L;K,C, θ) is defined as follows:
l∗(L;K,C, θ) = l∗2(K,C,L, θ) such that Z
l(l,K,C, L, θ) = 0
Note that l∗(L;K,C, θ) maps into itself; otherwise Z l(l, c,K, L, θ) cannot be zero.
Now, I need to show that l∗(L;K,C, θ) is increasing in L. Take L
′ ≥ L for every
L
′
and L ∈ [0, 1]. By definition of l∗(L;K,C, θ), Z l(l∗, K, C, L, θ) = 0. As e(K,N) is
strictly increasing in N by assumption 1(iii), Z l(l,K,C, L, θ) is strictly increasing in
L. Hence, Z l(l∗(L;K,Cθ), c,K, L
′
, θ) ≥ 0. I have already shown that Z l(l, c,K, L, θ)
is decreasing in l so l∗(L
′
; c,K, θ) ≥ l∗(L; c,K, θ).
Thus, l∗(L;K,C, θ) is increasing in L and it maps from [0, 1] to itself.
(iv) l∗(L;K,C, θ) is increasing transformation in L and it maps from [0, 1] to
itself. Also, [0, 1] is a complete lattice so by Tarski’s fixed point theorem (Tarski
(1955)), there exists a complete lattice of fixed points of l∗(L;K,C, θ) which I call
as Ψ(K,C, θ). Further, I will have least and greatest leisure choices l∧(K,C, θ) and
l∨(K,C, θ) such that
∧Ψ(K,C, θ) = l∧(K,C, θ)
∨Ψ(K,C, θ) = l∨(K,C, θ)
which are well-defined by Tarski’s theorem.
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I also show that both of these selections are increasing in C and decreasing in K.
As both proofs are very similar to each other, I will only show for ∧Ψ∗(K,C, θ).
Consider Z l(l,K,C, L, θ) in equation (3.20). By Assumption 2, Z l(l, c,K, L, θ)
is increasing in C so l∗(L;K,C, θ) is increasing in C. Similarly, as Z l(l,K,C, L, θ)
is decreasing in K by assumption 1(iii), so is l∗(L;K,C, θ). Thus, l∗(L;K,C, θ) is
increasing in C and decreasing in K. Equivalently, it is increasing in (−K,C).
Now, l∗(L;K,C, θ) is in [0, 1] × K × [0, y(K,N, θ)] × Θ. [0, 1] is a complete lat-
tice and K and [0, y(K,N, θ)] are partially ordered sets. l∗(L;K,C, θ) is nonempty,
subcomplete sublattice of L for each (K,C, θ) and by previous paragraph l(L;K,C, θ)
is increasing in (L,−K,C). Then, by Veinott’s Fixed Point Comparative Statics
Theorem (Chapter 4, Theorem 14) (Veinott (1992))), ∧Ψ(K,C, θ) is increasing in
(−K,C). Equivalently speaking, ∧Ψ(K,C, θ) = l∗∧(K,C, θ) is decreasing in K and
decreasing in C.
I can further show these selections are continuous. This is a necessary step in the
rest of the paper.
Lemma 3.3.2 Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3(i) or 3(ii), ∨Ψ(K,C, θ) = l∗∨(K,C, θ)
and ∧Ψ(K,C, θ) = l∗∧(K,C, θ) are continuous ordered solutions in (K,C).
Proof 3.3.0.2 I prove that l∗∧(K,m, θ) is continuous. By Raines and Stockman
(2010), Proposition 4, utility function satisfies necessary Inada and concavity condi-
tions. Also, equilibrium labor demand condition satisfies the following by Assumption
1(iv).
lim
N→0
f2(K,N, θ)e(K,N) = 0 (3.21)
Now I am going to apply local Implicit Function Theorem on this Z l function. As the
utility function and production function is assumed to be C2 in Assumption 0, Z l is
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C1 function. Moreover, both (0, 1) and (0, k¯) are open subset of Banach space and R
is another subset of Banach space. I know that by definition,
Z(l∧(c∗, K∗, θ), c∗, K∗, l∧(c∗, K∗, θ), θ) = 0 (3.22)
The implicit function theorem implies that
∂l∗∧(K,C, θ)
∂w
=
u21
u22u1 − u12u2 < 0 (3.23)
which implies that ∂n
∗∧(K,C,θ)
∂w
> 0. Hence, Frisch labor supply curve is upward sloping.
Also, at l = 1 (equivalently n = 0) with c > 0, the implied w is strictly positive
because u1(c, 1) > 0 and u2(c, 1) > 0. Hence, by equation (3.21), we know that for
N sufficiently small, labor supply curve is above labor demand curve. Thus, the first
transversal crossing of labor supply by labor demand is from below.
Since limN→1 f2(K,N, θ)e(K,N) < ∞, labor demand curve is eventually below
labor supply curve. Hence, there is at least two crossings and the last one is from
above. As we also have supermodularity of utility function, by Proposition 5 at Raines
and Stockman (2010), Euler equation branching 8 exists so we can write l∗∧(K,m, θ)
as continuous function. Same argument applies for l∗∨(K,m, θ).
Hence, I obtain the leisure choices as a function of (K,C, θ). Next step is to com-
pute the ’contingent’ consumption choices. For that, I need the following assumption:
Assumption 4 u(c, l) satisfies the following condition:
u11
u12
<
u21
u2
− u11
u1
u22
u2
− u12
u1
+ F22(k, n,K,N, θ)
u1
u2
(3.24)
8According to Stockman and Raines, in a typical dynamic model, the dynamics are described with
a differential equation such as x˙ = f(x). However, if we have Euler equation branching, the dynamics
are described by a differential inclusion x˙ ∈ H(x) where H is a set-valued function. Generally,
H(x) = {f(x), g(x)} where f and g are continuous functions (referred as ’branches’).(Raines and
Stockman (2010))
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As I have already seen in the previous lemma, when the wage rate is increasing in n,
I may have multiplicity of equilibria. In that case, I have analyzed the characteristics
of the least and greatest selections of leisure choice. Hence, I am going analyze the
characteristics of consumption decision by taking these selections into consideration.
As for each different leisure choices, individual’s consumption decision changes, in the
following analysis, I denote individual consumption decision as c∧(.) when the leisure
choice is l∧(c,K, θ) and as c∨(.) when the leisure choice is l∨(c,K, θ).
Equilibrium consumption decisions is defined by equation (3.15). For the least
selection of leisure choice, the following is going to be the case:
uc(c, l
∗
∧(K,C, θ))−
1
m
= 0 if c > 0 (3.25)
where 1
m
> 0 as inverse marginal utility operator m > 0.
Now, define
Zc(c,K,C,m, θ) = u1(c, l
∗
∧(K,C, θ))−
1
m
(3.26)
I have the following lemma:
Lemma 3.3.3 Given Assumptions 0, 1, 3(ii) and 4, when c = C, there exists a
unique c∗(K,m, θ) for both the least and greatest equilibrium leisure choice selection.
Further, each equilibrium consumption choice is decreasing in K and increasing in
m.
Proof 3.3.0.3 The proof is for l∗∧(K,C, θ). The proofs for l
∗
1(K,C, θ) under assump-
tion 3(i) and l∗∨(K,C, θ) is very similar.
Now, consider equation 3.26 when C = c. Recall that l∗∧(K,C, θ) is increasing in
C by Lemma 3.3.1 so by assumptions 1(i) and 4, Zc(K, c,m, θ) is strictly decreasing
in c. Also, as uc(c, l
∗(K, c, θ)) satisfies Inada conditions by Assumption 1(i) so is
Zˆc(K, c,m, θ). Hence, there exist a unique c∗∧(K,m, θ).
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Now, I need to prove that c∗∧(K,m, θ) is decreasing in K and increasing in m. Re-
member that I find in Lemma 3.3.1 that l∗∧(K,C, θ) is decreasing in K. Hence, higher
K leads to lower leisure choice which implies lower Zc(K, c,m, θ) by supermodular-
ity of utility function. So, higher K brings about lower c∗∧(K,m, θ). Similarly, as
Zc(K, c,m, θ) is strictly increasing in m, c∗∧(K,m, θ) is increasing in m.
Lastly, I will prove the continuity of these selections.
Lemma 3.3.4 Given Assumptions 1, 2 3 and 4, c∗∧(K,m, θ) and c
∗
∨(K,m, θ) is con-
tinuous in (K,m).
Proof 3.3.0.4 By Lemma 3.3.1, leisure choice is continuous. I also know that by
assumption 1(i), the utility function is continuous. Consider equation 3.26 again.
Now, take a convergent series such that (Kn,mn) → (K,m). As the utility function
is continuous by assumption 1(i) and leisure choice is continuous by Lemma 3.3.1,
C∗∧(K,m, θ) is continuous in (K,m)
I have c∗∧(K,m, θ) and l
∗
∧(K, c, θ). We can plug contingent consumption deci-
sions into leisure decision to get contingent leisure choice as a function of (K,m, θ).
Same argument applies for the greatest selection as well. Hence, l∗∧(K,m, θ) =
l∗∧(K, c(K,m, θ), θ).
As c∗∧(K,m, θ) is increasing in m and l
∗
∧(K, c, θ) is increasing in c, l
∗
∧(K,m, θ) is
increasing in m.
Similarly, as c∗∧(K,m, θ) and l
∗
∧(K, c, θ) are decreasing in K and c
∗
∧(K, c, θ) is
decreasing in K, l∗∧(K,m, θ) is decreasing in K.
3.3.2 Fixed Point Decomposition
Before proceeding with constructing an increasing fixed point decomposition, I
now describe the mathematical structure of it. The idea of an increasing fixed
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point decomposition was introduced in Datta et al. (2017). Let (G(S),≥), (H1(S1),≥
), (H2(S2),≥) be three Banach spaces where S is a subspace of Si for each i = 1, 2.
Assume
A∗ : G(S)→ G(S)
is the fixed point problem I am trying to solve.
Definition 3.3.1 An operator A : H1(S1) × H2(S2) → H1(S1) is a fixed point
decomposition of A∗(h)(s) if the mapping A satisfies the following conditions:
(i) The partial map A(h1;h2(s2)(s1) has a nonempty fixed point correspondence
ΨA(h2(s2))(s1) ⊂ H1(S1). for each (h2) ∈ H2(S2),
(ii) There exist a selection B(h2)(s2) ∈ ΨA(h2(s2))(s1) such that the mapping
B(h2)(s) when restricted to the subspace S ∈ S has a nonempty set of fixed points ΨB
and each fixed point h∗2 ∈ ΨB satisfies
B(h∗2(s)) = h
∗
2(s) = A
∗(g∗)(s)
= g∗(s) ∈ ΨA(s) ⊂ G∗(S)
Definition 3.3.2 Let Hi(Si), G
∗(S) are all partial ordered sets. An operator
A(h1(s1), h2(s2)) is an increasing fixed point decomposition of A
∗(g∗) at (g∗) if
(i) A is a parameterized fixed point decomposition of A∗(g)(s) at (g∗(s)) ∈ G∗
(ii) A(h1, h2) is jointly increasing on H1×H2 endowed with its product order for
each (s1, s2) ∈ S × S
(iii) The partial map B(h2)(s) ∈ ΨA(h2(s)) is a jointly increasing selection
(h2(s)) ∈ G∗ in ΨA(h2(s))(s) for s ∈ S.
Definition 3.3.3 A(h1(s1), h2(s2)) is an order continuous fixed point decom-
position of A∗(g∗) at (g∗) if
(i) A(h1(s1), h2(s2)) is jointly order continuous in (h1(s1), h2(s2)).
(ii) B(h2)(s) is an order continuous selection in ΨA(h2(s)) in h2 for each s ∈ S.
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3.3.3 Constructing an Increasing Fixed Point Decomposition
I now use these results on the equilibrium side conditions to solve for recursive
equilibrium. Using the side conditions, we can write the equilibrium evolution of the
individual and aggregate state variables (k,K) when k = K in terms of the inverse
marginal utility of consumption m defined in equation (3.15). To do this, using
[1 − l∗(K,m, θ)] = n∗(K,m, θ) = n∗ = N∗(K,m, θ), equilibrium income can be as
follows:
y = R(K,n∗, θ)K + w(K,n∗, θ)n∗ + (1− δ)K + Π = F (K,n∗, θ;n∗). (3.27)
where F (K,n∗, θ;n∗) = F (K,n∗(K,m, θ), K, n∗(K,m, θ), θ). We can then update
next period’s state given today’s inverse marginal utility m by using the period budget
constraint of household in equilibrium: i.e., using the least solution for leisure, we
have the following law of motion on K:
g∧(K,m, θ) = F (K,n∗∧(K,m, θ), θ;n
∗)− c∗(K,m, θ) = K ′ (3.28)
where n∗∧(K,m, θ) = 1− l∗∧(K,m, θ).
We have the following useful lemma under either Assumption 3(i) or 3(ii):
Lemma 3.3.5 Let assumptions 1, 2 and 3(i) or 3(ii) hold. Then, in any recursive
equilibrium (c∗, N∗)(s) when K = k > 0, recursive equilibrium investment g∧(K,m, θ)
is increasing in k for each (m, θ) and decreasing in m for each (K, θ).
Proof 3.3.0.5 By Lemma 3.3.1, l∗∧(K,m, θ) is increasing in m and decreasing in
K. Hence, n∗∧(K,m, θ) is decreasing in m and increasing in K. By Lemma 3.3.3,
c∗(K,m, θ) is decreasing in K and increasing in m.
Then, if we increase K, first term in equation (3.28) will increase, while the second
term will decrease. Therefore, g∧(K,m, θ) is increasing in K.
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Further, if we increase m, the first term will decrease, while the second term to
increase. Therefore, g∧(K,m, θ) is decreasing in m.
Next, we look at the return on capital in equilibrium. To study the movements
of the return on capital in terms of k, we introduce a new state variable, say kˆ , and
decompose the comparative static into movements of k into ”increasing” and ”de-
creasing” terms, and study the behavior of the return on capital along the restriction
that k = kˆ. Along those lines, define using the least equilibrium labor solution:
R(k, kˆ,m;n∗∧(k,m, θ)) = f1(k, n
∗
∧(kˆ,m, θ), θ)e(kˆ, n
∗
∧(kˆ,m, θ)) (3.29)
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3.6 Under Assumption 1, 2 and 3(i) or 3(ii), R(k, kˆ,m;n∗∧(k,m, θ)) is
decreasing in k and m, and increasing in kˆ.
Proof 3.3.0.6 Consider equation (3.29). The function f is the only term which
depends on k and by concavity of f in Assumption 1(iii), R is decreasing in k.
Now I am going to show that R is decreasing in m. By Lemma (3.3.1), it is known
that l∗∧(k,m, θ) is increasing in m and n
∗
∧(k,m, θ) = 1 − l∗∧(k,m, θ) so n∗∧(k,m, θ) is
decreasing in m. Hence, by supermodularity of f under Assumption 1(iii), lower n∗,
leads to a lower f1 and as e is increasing in its first arguments under Assumption
1(iii), lower n leads to lower e. Combining these two statements yields R is decreasing
in m.
Finally, for R being increasing in kˆ, note by Assumption 1(iii), e and f1 is in-
creasing (as f is supermodular), and n∗∧ is increasing in kˆ by 3.3.1. Combining all of
these facts gives us the result that R is increasing in kˆ.
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We are now ready to define a two step monotone map method to construct re-
cursive equilibrium on a minimal state space. To do this, first define the following
mapping which is based on the household’s Euler equation when K = k:
u1(c
∗
∧(k,m, θ), l
∗
∧(k,m, θ))
= β
∑
θ′∈Θ
{u1(c∗∧(g∧(k,m, θ),m(g∧(k,m, θ), θ), θ), l∗∧(g∧(k,m, θ),m(g∧(k,m, θ), θ), θ))
· f1(g∧(k,m, θ), n∗∧(g∧(k,m, θ),m(g∧(k,m, θ), θ), θ), θ)
· e(g∧(k,m, θ), n∗∧(g∧(k,m, θ),m(g∧(k,m, θ), θ)) · χ(θ, θ′)} (3.30)
where l∗∧(k,m, θ) = 1− n∗∧(k,m, θ).
Normally, any investment function which satisfies above equation can be said to
be one of the recursive equilibrium. Finding those recursive equilibrium would be
easy if both sides of the above Euler equation was monotonic in k and m under
Assumption 1. As this is not the case, to find the set of equilibria which satisfies
the Euler equation (3.30), I construct an increasing fixed point decomposition for the
recursive equilibrium functional equation defined in (3.13).
Hence, define the following two function spaces for m to use in the increasing fixed
point decomposition:
M1(S) = {m1(k, θ) | 0 ≤ m1(k, θ) ≤ u−11 (F (k,m, θ), l(F (k,m, θ), k, θ))
and m is increasing in k st. g∧(K,m, θ) is increasing in K}
M2(S) = {m2(k, θ) | 0 ≤ m2(k) ≤ ∞ }
While using a fixed point decomposition, we need to be clear on where the recur-
sive equilibrium exists for the actual operator A∗(g)(s) defined on (3.13). For any
decomposition of recursive equilibrium operators in the space M1(S)×M2(S), where
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aggregate state variables are elements of M2, the resulting recursive equilibrium will
exist in the following space:
G∗(S;M2) = {m(k, kˆ, θ)| for each kˆ, m(k; kˆ, θ) ∈M1; (3.31)
for fixed k and each θ, m(k, kˆ, θ) ∈M2(S), k = kˆ}
Hence, as mentioned above, recursive equilibrium is defined on a subclass where
investment (g∧(K,m, θ)) is increasing in K. Given these definitions, I note the fol-
lowing useful lemma:
Lemma 3.3.7 Under Assumptions 1 and 2,
(i) M1(S) is a complete lattice under pointwise partial order.
(ii) M2(S) is a complete lattice under pointwise partial order.
(iii) G∗(S;M2) is a complete lattice under pointwise partial order.
Proof 3.3.0.7 (i) To see M1(S) is a complete lattice, take an arbitrary subset M1 ⊂
M1(S). Since the pointwise inf and sup operations on the elements of M1 preserve
pointwise bounds, we have 0 ≤ ∧M1 ≤ u−11 (F (k,m, θ), l(F (k,m, θ), k, θ)) and 0 ≤
∨M1 ≤ u−11 (F (k,m, θ), l(F (k,m, θ), k, θ)). Also, as for each m1 ∈ M1 ⊂ M1, m1 is
increasing in k such that (y − c)(k,m, θ) is increasing in k for each θ, pointwise inf
and sup operations preserve the monotonicity property. Hence, both ∧M1 (respectively
∨M1) is increasing in k such that (y − c)(k,∧m, θ) is increasing in k for each θ as
well. Then, ∧M1 ∈M1 and ∨M1 ∈M1. Thus, M1(S) is a complete lattice.
(ii) Similarly, take an arbitrary set M2 ⊂ M2. Pointwise infs are bounded by 0
from below and pointwise sups are bounded trivially by +∞ from above. Hence, M2
is a complete lattice.
(iii) I next show that G∗(S;M2) is a complete lattice under pointwise partial order.
As I did previously, take an arbitrary G ∈ G∗(S;M2). Since each m(k, kˆ, θ) ∈ G is
85
equicontinuous for each kˆ (i.e., m(k, kˆ, θ) ∈ M1 for each kˆ and θ), this property is
preserved under pointwise inf and sup operators as mentioned in part (i). Similarly,
for each (k, θ), m(k, kˆ, θ) ∈ [0,∞]. Therefore, ∧G and ∨G ∈ G∗. Thus, G∗(S;M2) is
a complete lattice.
Finally, using (3.30), we construct our operator as follows: when K = kˆ = k > 0,
m1 > 0, using equation (3.15), substitute
1
m
for marginal utility of consumption in the
original Euler equation (3.30), decompose the fixed point problem into one involving
three unknown functions (m1,m2,m3): i.e., define
Zm(x, k, kˆ,m1,m2,m3) =
1
x
− β
∑
θ′∈Θ
{f1(g
∧(k,m3, θ), n∗∧(g∧(kˆ,m2, θ),m1(g∧(kˆ,m3, θ)), θ′), θ′)
m1(g∧(k, x, θ), θ′)
· e(g∧(kˆ,m2, θ), n∗∧(g∧(kˆ,m2, θ),m1(g∧(kˆ,m3, θ), θ′), θ′)) · χ(θ, θ′)}
equivalently,
Zm(x, k, kˆ, θ,m1,m2,m3) =
1
x
−β
∑
θ′∈Θ
{
R(g, g′,m1)
m1(g∧(k, x, θ), θ′)
· χ(θ, θ′)
} (3.32)
where R(g, g′,m1) is
R(g∧(k,m3, θ), g∧(kˆ,m2, θ),m1(g∧(kˆ,m3, θ), θ′);
n∗∧(g
∧(kˆ,m2, θ),m1(g∧(kˆ,m3, θ), θ′), θ′))
We first prove a useful lemma about this equation.
Lemma 3.3.8 Under Assumption 1, 2, and either Assumption 3(i) or 3(ii), Zm is
decreasing in (x,m3), and increasing in (k,m1,m2).
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Proof 3.3.0.8 Throughout the proof, consider equation (3.32)
The first term is decreasing in x. In the second term, g∧ is decreasing in x. As
m1 is increasing in K, the whole term is increasing in x. Due to the negative sign in
front of the second term, we can conclude that Zm is decreasing in x.
Next, if m3 increases, g
∧(k,m3, θ) decreases by Lemma 3.3.5. I know that rental
rate is decreasing in its first and third arguments by Lemma 3.3.6. Hence, rental rate
rises. Combining with the negative sign in front of the second term of equation Zm,
Zm is decreasing in m3.
Next, by Lemma 3.3.5, g∧(k,m3, θ) is increasing in k. Hence, higher k leads to
lower rental rate by Lemma 3.3.6. Also, as k increases, it leads to higher capital accu-
mulation at individual decisions, g∧(k, x, θ). Together with m1 ∈M1 being increasing,
I conclude that m1 increases with higher k. Combining all these facts with negative
sign in front of the second term leads to higher Zm. Hence, Zm is increasing in k.
Higher m1 decreases the seconds term so overall increases Z
m.
Finally, for m2, as m2 increases, g
∧(kˆ,m2, θ) decreases due to Lemma 3.3.5. This
decrease also brings about lower labor supply. Overall, by Lemma 3.3.6, rental rate
decreases. Together with the negative sign in front of the second term of equation Zm,
Zm is increasing in m2.
We can now define an increasing fixed point decomposition as follows: when k =
kˆ > 0, impose x∗ = m3 pointwise, compute the root x∗ = x∗(k, kˆ, θ,m1,m2) defined
implicitly in:
Zm(x∗, k, kˆ, θ,m1,m2, x∗) = 0
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and define the operator:
A(m1,m2)(k, kˆ, θ) = x
∗(k, kˆ, θ,m1,m2) for k = kˆ > 0 and 0 < m1 ≤ u−11
= 0 else
We seek a solution m∗ = m1 = m2 = g∗ ∈ G∗(S), when k = kˆ, where A(m∗,m∗)(s) =
A∗(g)(s) is the actual recursive equilibrium operator in (3.13) and s = (k, kˆ, θ).
The following lemma summarizes the characteristics of the operator A(m1,m2):
Lemma 3.3.9 Under assumption 1, 2 and either assumption 3(i) or 3(ii),
A(m1,m2)(s) is an increasing fixed point decomposition of A
∗(g)(s) on M1(S) ×
M2(S) = G∗(S;M2)
Proof 3.3.0.9 First, in equation (3.32), we have m3 = x
∗ = A(m1,m2) for a given
m2:
Zm(A(m1,m2), k, kˆ, θ,m1,m2, A(m1,m2)) =
1
A(m1,m2)
−β
∑
θ′∈Θ
{
R(g∧(k,A(m1,m2), θ), g∧(kˆ,m2, θ),m1(g∧(kˆ, A(m1,m2)), θ), θ′);n∗∧)
m1(g∧(k,A(m1,m2), θ), θ′)
· χ(θ, θ′)
}
(3.33)
where n∗∧ = n
∗
∧(g
∧(kˆ,m2, θ),m1(g∧(kˆ, A(m1,m2), θ), θ′), θ′).
First, we show that A(m1,m2) is a fixed point decomposition of A
∗ in Definition
3.3.1. For fixed m2, denote A(m1;m2) as
A(m1;m2)(s) = ΨA(m2(s))(s) (3.34)
We first show for fixed m2(kˆ, θ) ∈M2, A(m1;m2) is increasing in m1. By Lemma
(3.3.8), Zm(x, k, kˆ, θ,m1,m2, x) is decreasing in x for each (k, kˆ, θ,m1,m2) and increas-
ing in m1 for each (k, kˆ, θ,m2); therefore, if we take any m1,m
′
1 ∈M1 such that m1 ≥
m
′
1, as Z
m is increasing in m1, 0 = Z
m(x∗, s,m1, x∗;m2) ≥ Zm(x∗, s,m′1, x∗;m2).
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Then, Zm(x∗, s,m
′
1, x
∗;m2) = 0 only if x∗(s,m1;m2)/geqx∗(s,m
′
1;m2) because Z
m
is decreasing in x. Then, x∗ is increasing in m1 which is equivalently saying that
A(m1;m2) is increasing in m1 due to the definition of the operator A in (3.33).
By the same token, one can show that A(m1,m2) is increasing in m2 for fixed m1.
We next show A(m1;m2) ∈ M1. Recall from Lemma 3.3.8, for Zm is decreasing
in x and increasing in k. Take k1 ≥ k0. Then, A(m1;m2)(k1, θ) ≥ A(m1;m2)(k0, θ).
Hence, the first term of equation (3.32) is
1
A(m1;m2)(k1, θ)
≤ 1
A(m1;m2)(k0, θ)
(3.35)
As Zm is increasing in k, it requires the second term to be smaller at k1 because
R is decreasing in its first and third argument by Lemma 3.3.6 and m1 is an isotone
function.
g∧(k,A(m1;m2)(k1, θ), θ) ≥ g∧(k,A(m1;m2)(k0, θ), θ) (3.36)
Thus, A(m1;m2) is increasing in k such that g
∧(k,m, θ) is increasing in k. Hence,
A(m1;m2)(s) ∈ M1. As A(m1;m2)(s) ∈ M1 is isotone in M1(S) where M1(S) is a
complete lattice, by Tarski’s fixed point theorem (Tarski (1955)), ΨA(m2(s))(s) is a
nonempty complete lattice in M1(S). As the state space used for M1 and M2 are the
same, the second condition of fixed point decomposition definition is automatically
satisfied. Denote B∧(m2)(s) = ∧ΨA(m2(s))(s) and B∨(m2)(s) = ∨ΨA(m2(s))(s).
B(m∗2(s)) = m
∗
2(s) = A
∗(g∗)(s)
= g∗(s) ∈ ΨA(s) ⊂ G∗(S)
Hence, A(m1,m2) is a fixed point decomposition.
Now I am going to show it is an increasing fixed point decomposition by checking
the conditions in Definition 3.3.2.
It is already shown that it is a fixed point decomposition. Now, I show A(m1,m2) is
jointly increasing on M1×M2. To see that A(m1,m2) is jointly increasing in (m1,m2),
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notice that Zm is jointly increasing in (m1,m2) and decreasing in x. Then, following
the same steps I took while proving A is increasing in m1 for fixed m2 and vice versa,
we can conclude that A(m1;m2) is jointly increasing in (m1,m2) on M1 ×M2.
Further, as ΨA(m2(s))(s) is an increasing function on M2, by Veinott’s fixed point
theorem (Veinott (1992)), ∧ΨA(m2(s))(s) and ∨ΨA(m2(s))(s) are increasing selec-
tions. As we denote B∧(m2)(s) = ∧ΨA(m2(s))(s) and B∨(m2)(s) = ∨ΨA(m2(s))(s),
one can conclude the partial map B(m2) is an increasing selection. Hence, by Defi-
nition 3.3.2, A is an increasing fixed point decomposition.
In addition to this, if I prove A(m1,m2) is order continuous, it will guarantee that
upward (downward) iterations from lower (upper) solutions will be order closed under
sup (inf) operations. Therefore, I will be able to provide the existence of continuous
and computable comparative statics.
Lemma 3.3.10 Under assumption 1 and 2, A(m1,m2)(s) is an order continuous
fixed point decomposition of A∗(g)(s) on M1(S)×M2(S) = G∗(S;M2).
Proof 3.3.0.10 According to the definition 3.3.3, I first check whether A is jointly
order continuous. According to (Gierz et al. (2003): Page 162, Lemma II-2.8),this
can be shown by proving A(m1;m2) and A(m2;m1) are order continuous respectively.
Given m2, Z
m equation looks like as follows:
Zm(A(m1;m2), k, kˆ, θ,m1,m2, A(m1;m2)) =
1
A(m1;m2)
−β
∑
θ′∈Θ
{
R(g∧(k,A(m1;m2), θ), g∧(kˆ,m2, θ),m1(g∧(kˆ, A(m1;m2)), θ), θ′);n∗∧)
m1(g∧(k,A(m1;m2), θ), θ′)
· χ(θ, θ′)
}
(3.37)
where n∗∧ = n
∗
∧(g
∧(kˆ,m2, θ),m1(g∧(kˆ, A(m1;m2), θ), θ′), θ′)
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Following the definition of order continuity, take an arbitrary increasing countable
chain {mn1 (s)} → m1(s). Hence, ∨{mn1} = m1 exists. Under the assumption 1(iii),
production function is C2 so the rental rate is continuous. Further, g(k,A(m1;m2), θ)
is continuous because consumption function is proved to be continuous in Lemma
3.3.4. Lastly, 1
A(m1;m2)
is also continuous. Therefore, because {mn1 (s)} → m1(s), this
leads to the following:
Zm(A(mn1 ;m2), k, kˆ, θ,m
n
1 ,m2, A(m
n
1 ;m2))→
Zm(A(m1;m2), k, kˆ, θ,m1,m2, A(m1;m2))
which implies that A(mn1 ;m2)→ A(m1;m2). As it is already proved in Lemma 3.3.9
that A(m1;m2) is increasing in m1, A(m
n
1 ;m2)) is an increasing countable chain.
Hence, ∨A(mn1 ;m2)) exists. Now, the following holds:
A(∨mn1 ;m2) = A(m1;m2) = ∨A(mn1 ;m2)
Hence, A(m1;m2) is order continuous.
Now, I prove A(m2;m1)) is order continuous. Similar to previous proof, be-
cause rental rate and next period capital stock function is continuous and additionally
m1(g
∧(k,A(m1;m2), θ), θ′) is also continuous,
Zm(A(mn2 ;m1), k, kˆ, θ,m
n
2 ,m1, A(m
n
2 ;m1))→
Zm(A(m2;m1), k, kˆ, θ,m1,m2, A(m2;m1))
which implies that A(mn2 ;m1)→ A(m2;m1). As it is already proved in Lemma 3.3.9
that A(m2;m1) is increasing in m2, A(m
n
2 ;m1)) is an increasing countable chain.
Hence, ∨A(mn2 ;m1)) exists. Now, the following holds:
A(∨mn2 ;m1) = A(m2;m1) = ∨A(mn2 ;m1)
Hence, A(m2;m1) is order continuous.
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Therefore, A(m2,m1) is jointly order continuous.
Now, I prove B(m2)(s) is an order continuous selection in ΨA(m2(s)) in m2 for
each s ∈ S. I prove it for the least fixed point selection B∧(m2)(s) = ∧ΨA(m2(s))(s).
The proof for the greatest selection B∨(m2)(s) = ∨ΨA(m2(s))(s) is similar.
Fix s ∈ S and the number of iteration n. Define the least fixed point map ∆n :
M2 →M2 as follows:
∆n(m2)(A
n(∧M1))(s) = An(∧M1;m2)(s)
∆(m2)(s) = sup
n
{∆n(An(∧M1))(s), n ∈ N}
Now, by induction I show that ∆n is order continuous on M2. Moreover, as
n→∞, ∆n(m2)(s)→ ∆(m2)(s) = fix(m2)(s) where fix(m2) is the least fixed point
map on M2 and order continuous on M2 for each s ∈ S.
Note that ∆0(m2)(∧M1) = A0(∧M1;m2) = 1 is a constant function by. Hence,
order continuous. By induction, assume that ∆n(A
n(∧M1)) is order continuous. As
the operator A(m1;m2) : M1 →M1, I have:
∆n+1(m2)(A
n+1(∧M1)) = A(An(∧M1))
= A(∆n(m2)(A
n(∧M1))(s))
= eval(A,∆n(m2)(A
n(∧M1))(s)
I already assume by induction that ∆n(A
n(∧M1)) is order continuous and further,
assume A is an order continuous function. Moreover, the ordered function spaces
are assumed to be posets. Hence, order continuity coincides with continuous lattices
9. Therefore, Scott’s corollary 3.4 on evaluation maps is applicable here (Scott and
Strachey (1971)). The evaluation map is order continuous. Further, by Lemma II-2.9
at Gierz et al. (2003), composition of order continuous maps are order continuous.
9The detailed explanation is at Datta et al. (2017)
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For each mapping An(m1;m2) : M1 →M1, iterations on n generate increasing chains
for fixed m2 because A(m1;m2) is order preserving:
∧M1 ≤ A(∧M1;m2) ≤ A2(∧M1;m2) ≤ ... ≤ An(∧M1;m2) ≤ ...
which implies by definition of ∆,
∆0(∧M1) ≤ ∆1(m2)(A(∧M1)) ≤ ... ≤ ∆n(m2)(An(∧M1)) ≤ ...
which is the set {∆n(An(∧M1))(s), n ∈ N}. This set is a countable chain. Then,
∆(m2)(s) = sup
n
{∆n(An(∧M1))(s), n ∈ N}
= ∨{An(∧M1,m2)(s), n ∈ N}
= fix(m2)(s)
where fix(m2) is the least fixed point mapping. The existence of such a fixed point is
based upon the Least Fixed Point Theorem for Scott Continuous Functions because M1
is a poset. Thus, fix(m2) is order continuous in m2 for each s ∈ S. Here, fix(m2)
is equivalent to the lowest selection B∧(m2, t)(s) in my formulation.
3.3.4 Existence of Recursive Equilibrium
Now that I have an order continuous increasing fixed point decomposition of
A∗(g)(s), I can prove the existence of recursive equilibrium.
Theorem 3.3.1 Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3(i),
(i) There exists a complete lattice of fixed points of the recursive equilibrium op-
erator A∗(g)(s) in (3.13) in G∗(S;M2)
(ii) This least recursive equilibrium c∗(s) ∈ G∗(S;M2) and the greatest recursive
equilibrium investment level g∗(s) = (y∗−c∗)(s) can be computed by successive approx-
imations as follows: sup
n
(y∗−c∗)(k,Bn(∨M2), θ)↘ g∗(s) = y∗−inf
n
c∗(k,Bn(∨M2), θ),
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where inf
n
c∗(k,Bn(∨M2), θ) = c∗(K,ΨB, θ) with g∗(s) increasing jointly in (k, k) for
each θ ∈ Θ.
(iii) As θ ∈ Θ is iid and follows a Markov process, recursive equilibrium invest-
ment g∗(s) is jointly monotone increasing in s = (k,K, θ) when K = k.
Proof 3.3.0.11 (i) First, by Lemma 3.3.9, A(m1,m2) is a well-defined increasing
fixed point decomposition so its fixed points correspond with the fixed points of A∗(g)(s)
in equation (3.13). Second, by Lemma 3.3.7(iii), G∗(S;M2) is a complete lattice.
Third, A∗ : G∗(S;M2) → G∗(S;M2). Hence by Tarski’s Fixed Point Theorem, there
exists a complete lattice of fixed points of the recursive equilibrium operator A∗(g)(s)
(Tarski (1955)).
(ii) As shown in Lemma 3.3.4, continuity of consumption function in m leads
c∗(k,Bn(∧M2), θ) → c∗(k,∧M2), θ) as Bn(∧M2) → B(∧M2). By Lemma 3.3.3, as
c∗ is increasing in m and by Lemma 3.3.10, B(m2) is inf-preserving (i.e. order
continuity) so inf
n
c∗(k,Bn(∧M2), θ) = c∗(K,ΨB, θ) and this maximize the investment
level.
The fact that g∗(k,K, θ) = (y∗−c∗)(k,K, θ) is increasing jointly in (k,K) for each
θ follows from the fact that c∗(s) is falling in k when K = k for each θ.
(iii) In order to prove this claim, I only need to prove if g∗ is monotone increasing
in θ because it has already been proven in part (ii) that g∗ is monotone increasing in
k.
With iid shocks, if I define
Mm2 (S) = {m2(k, θ)| 0 ≤ m2(k, θ) ≤ ∞ and
m2 is increasing in θ such that g
∗(k, θ) = (y∗ − c∗)(k, θ)is increasing in θ}
A(m1,m2) transforms into the space M1×Mm2 so both c∗(k,m1(k,m2(k, θ), θ)) will
be increasing in θ because c∗ is proved to be increasing in m in Lemma 3.3.3. Also,
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g∗(k,m1(k,m2(k, θ), θ)) will also be increasing in θ by assumption on Mm2 (S). As a
function is said to be jointly monotone if it is monotone in all its argument, it means
recursive equilibrium investment g∗(s) is jointly monotone increasing in s = (k,K, θ)
when K = k.10
3.4 Comparing Recursive Equilibrium
I now provide some robust recursive equilibrium comparative statics. I begin with
how changes in discount rates affects the capital accumulation. After that, I show
how perturbations in externality affects capital accumulation and consumption.
First, I define partial orders on discount factor and externality. For discount
factors, let β ∈ (0, 1) = B such that B is endowed with the standard partial order on
E which is the Euclidean space.
For externality, define F = {F | F satisfies Assumptions 1 and 3(i)}. As Datta
et al. (2017) do in their paper, I categorize the class of technologies into ’gradient
admissible production functions’, Fm which from equidifferentiable collections in the
C1 uniform topology.
For x = (k, n,K,N, θ) ∈ P = K× [0, 1]×K× [0, 1]×Θ, I parameterize subclasses
of production functions that have the gradients (respectively, diagonal elements) sat-
10Note that B(∨M2) < ∞ for ∨M2 = ∞ by the definition of M1 and M2. We know
B(∞) inΨA(∞) = A(m1;∞) and in lemma 3.3.9, I already show that A(m1;m2) ∈ M1 which
is bounded by
1
u1(c(k,A(m1;m2), θ), l(c(k,A(m1;m2), θ), k, θ))
from above. Now, A(m1;m2) can never be ∞ as
1
u1(c(k,A(m1;m2), θ), l(c(k,A(m1;m2), θ), k, θ))
is bounded from above by budget constraint of the household. Hence, A(m1;m2) < ∞. Then any
selection from the fixed points of this function would be finite as well. Hence, B(∞) <∞.
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isfying pointwise bounds relative to a C1 function bL(x) (respectively, diagonal bound
bG(x)) where bL(x) and bG(x) have the following properties:
(i) bL : P→ R∗+ is an extended real valued function such that each bL is
(a) locally Lipschitz continuous ∀x ∈ P with bL(x) <∞ for x inP, x 6= 0,
(b) bL(k, n,K,N, θ) = 0 if any element of the vector (k, n,K,N, θ) equal to zero.
(c) satisfies the following Inada conditions:
lim
k→0
bL(x)→∞, (n,K,N, θ) >> 0; lim
k→∞
bL(x)→∞, (n,K,N, θ) >> 0
(ii) bG : P→ R∗− is an extended real valued function such that each bG is
(a) locally Lipschitz continuous ∀c ∈ P with bG(x) < −∞ for x ∈ P, x 6= 0
(b) bG(k, n,K,N, θ) = 0 if any element of the vector (k, n,K,N, θ) equal to zero.
(c) satisfies the following Inada conditions:
lim
k→0
bG(x)→ −∞, (n,K,N, θ) >> 0; lim
k→∞
bG(x)→∞, (n,K,N, θ) >> 0
Now, define a binary relation B on F as follows: for F 1 and F 2 in F such that:
F 1 B F 2ifF 1(x)− F 2(x) is increasing in each component of x
Here, B defines an equivalence class for production function in such a way that
each equivalence class includes production functions which have same marginal prod-
ucts in each component. For simplicity, I apply the relation B to a particular subsets
of production functions Fm which is the set of gradient admissible production func-
tions. In particular, I apply it to the xi-projections of the elements of Fm. Therefore,
B generates a partial order on production function and we can generate comparative
statics across elements of x by pointwise comparative statics analysis.
Now define
Fi = {Fˆ | Fˆ (xi;x−i) ∈ F, xi ∈ proji(P)}
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and consider the following equidifferentiable subclass of Fifor m(x) = (bL, bG)(x)
F im = {F ∈ Fi | 5 (Fˆ (xi)) ≤ bL(xi),52Fˆ (xi) ≤ bG(xi),∀xi ∈ proji(P)}
where I suppress the notation x−i in F ans use F (xi) to imply that comparison will
be in argument xi.
As P is compact, the elements Fˆ ∈ Fim are pointwise bounded. Also, since the
technology is assumed to be continuous here, each Fim is compact (and convex) subset
of F under C1 uniform topology.
Lemma 3.4.1 For any m(x) = (bL, bG)(x), (Fim,B) is a CCPO (i.e. Chain Complete
Partial Order).
Proof 3.4.0.1 The proof is exactly the same with the proof of Lemma 16, Page 51
at (Datta et al. (2017)).
Now that the partial orders are introduced, I can prove comparative statics part.
I begin with a theorem on robust comparative statics on the discount rate and finish
with comparative statics in the production externality.
Theorem 3.4.1 (Capital Deepening in Discount Rates) Let β1 ≥ β2 which
β1, β2 ∈ (0, 1) = B. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3(i), for the least recursive equilibrium
consumption c∗(s; β) ∈ G∗(S;M2), we have the following:
(i) c∗(s; β1) ≤ c∗(s; β2) and upper semicontinuous in (k, k, β) for each θ ∈ Θ
with implied recursive equilibrium investment g∗(s; β) = y∗(s; β) − c∗(s; β) satisfying
g∗(s; β1) ≥ g∗(s; β2) and lower semicontinuous in (k, k, β) for each θ.
(ii) The recursive equilibrium comparison is preserved under successive approxi-
mations for each s ∈ S,
inf
n
c∗(k,An(∧M∗1(m2)), θ; β1) ↘ c∗(k,A(∧M∗1(m2)), θ; β1)
≤ inf
n
c∗(k,An(∧M∗1(m2)), θ; β2) ↘ c∗(k,A(∧M∗1(m2)), θ; β2)
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with g∗ = y∗(s)− c∗(s; β).
Proof 3.4.0.2 (i) For simplicity, let’s rewrite equation (3.32) when x∗(s;m1,m2, β) =
A(m1,m2; β) for a given m2:
Zm(A(m1,m2), k, kˆ, θ,m1,m2, A(m1,m2)) =
1
A(m1,m2)
−β
∑
θ′∈Θ
{
R(g∧(k,A(m1,m2), θ), g∧(kˆ,m2, θ),m1(g∧(kˆ, A(m1,m2)), θ), θ′);n∗∧)
m1(g∧(k,A(m1,m2), θ), θ′)
· χ(θ, θ′)
}
where n∗∧ = n
∗
∧(g
∧(kˆ,m2, θ),m1(g∧(kˆ, A(m1,m2), θ), θ′), θ′)
As the second term is increasing in β, Zm is decreasing in β due to negative sign
in front of the second term. By Assumption 1, Zm is continuously decreasing in
x so A(m1,m2; β) is continuously decreasing in β. This is equivalently saying that
c∗(s; β) is decreasing in β. Then, the implied investment g∗(s; β) = y∗(s)− c∗(s; β) is
increasing in β.
Further,
y∗(s)− c∗(k,Bn(∧M2)(s; β), θ) = Bng (s; β)
the evaluation map for Bng (s; β) is jointly order continuous on G(S;M2)×K×K×B
because eval(Bng , k, k, β) is continuous in its order topology, and increasing jointly in
(Bng , k, k, β). This implies ∨Bng (s; β) is lower semicontinuous in (k, k, β) for each θ.
Hence, c∗ is upper semicontinuous in (k, k, β) for each θ.
(ii) By part (ii),
An(m1,m2; β1) ≤ An(m1,m2; β1)
By order continuity of A(m1,m2) in each argument and continuity of consumption
function,
inf
n
c∗(k,An(∧M∗1(m2)), θ; β1) ↘ c∗(k,A(∧M∗1(m2)), θ; β1)
≤ inf
n
c∗(k,An(∧M∗1(m2)), θ; β2) ↘ c∗(k,A(∧M∗1(m2)), θ; β2)
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The conclusion is quite intuitive. Since higher discount rates can be interpreted
as households being more patient, they prefer to consume less and save more for the
future.
As the production externality is one of the distinguished characteristics of this
economy, I find it useful to have a comparative statics analysis on it as well. The
theorem is as follow:
Theorem 3.4.2 (Comparing Recursive Equilibrium under Ordered Changes
in the Externality) Let F 1 = f · e1 ≥ F 2 = f · e2 for F 1, F 2 ∈ F. Then, under
Assumption 1, 2, 3(i),
(i) The least recursive equilibrium c∗(s; e) ∈ G∗(S;M2) has implied greatest recur-
sive equilibrium investment g∧(s; e) = (y∗ − c∗)(s; e) such that g∧(s; e1) ≥ g∧(s; e2).
(ii) This recursive equilibrium comparison is reserved under successive approxi-
mations such that
sup
n
y∗(s; e1)− c∗(k,Bn(∧M2)(s; e1), θ)↘ sup
n
y∗(s; e2)− c∗(k,Bn(∧M2)(s; e2), θ)
Proof 3.4.0.3 (i) Note that e1 ≥ e2 should be interpreted as e1 is higher in (Fim,B)
for i = {K,N} for fixed bounding function m.
To be more precise about the comparative statics for perturbations of e, I need to
analyze its effects on wage rate and rental rate separately. Throughout the proof, wage
rate effect is denoted by eˆ, and rental rate effect is denoted by e. The total effect will
occur when e = eˆ.
Consider equation 3.19. As Z l1 is decreasing in eˆ, the mapping l
∗(L;K,m, θ; eˆ)
at Lemma 3.3.1 is decreasing in eˆ. Hence, when eˆ1 ≥ eˆ2, the least leisure selection
satisfies the following:
l∗∧(K,m, θ; eˆ
1) ≤ l∗∧(K,m, θ; eˆ2)
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which is to say l∗∧ is decreasing in eˆ. Then, the following holds by the fact that
n∗∧ = 1− l∗∧:
n∗∧(K,m, θ; eˆ
1) ≥ n∗∧(K,m, θ; eˆ2) (3.38)
When k = K > 0∀θ ∈ Θ, m1 ∈ M1 and m2 ∈ M2, write the fixed point decompo-
sition as follows:
Zm(x∗, k, kˆ,m1,m2, x∗;F ) =
1
x∗
− β
∑
θ′∈Θ
{f1(g
∧(k, x∗, θ; e), n∗∧(g∧(kˆ,m2, θ; eˆ),m1(g∧(kˆ, x∗, θ; e)), θ′), θ′)
m1(g∧(k, x∗, θ; e), θ′)
· e(g∧(kˆ,m2, θ; e), n∗∧(g∧(kˆ,m2, θ; eˆ),m1(g∧(kˆ, x∗, θ; e), θ′), θ′)) · χ(θ, θ′)} = 0
Denote the dependence of current income on changes in eˆ in any period:
y∗(k,m, θ; eˆ) = f(k, n∗∧(k,m, θ; eˆ)) · eˆ(k, n∗∧(k,m, θ; eˆ))
where y∗(k,m, θ; eˆ) is increasing in eˆ as l∗∧ is decreasing in eˆ and both f and e are
increasing functions in their arguments (Assumption 1(iii)).
Now, consider the Zm equation. Under Assumption 1(iii) and equation (3.38), the
second term is decreasing in eˆ. This implies that x∗ = x∗(s,m1,m2; eˆ, e) = A(m1,m2)
is increasing in eˆ as Zm is falling in x∗ under Lemma 3.3.8. This is equivalently
saying that c∗(k,A(m1,m2), θ)(s; eˆ, e)) is increasing in eˆ.
Then, let’s hold y∗(k,A(m1,m2), θ; eˆ)− c∗(k,A(m1,m2))(s; eˆ, e) constant. As the
first term in Zm is decreasing in eˆ, g∧(k,A(m1,m2), θ; eˆ, e) should be increasing in eˆ.
Therefore, for fixed e, both consumption and investment are increasing in eˆ.
Now I will hold the wage rate effect constant and examine the rental rate effect.
Hence, hold eˆ constant and assume e1 ≥ e2. Now, as f1 · e1 ≥ f1 · e21, the second term
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in Zm is increasing in e. Hence, Zm is decreasing in e which implies x∗(s,m1,m2; eˆ, e)
is decreasing in e. Equivalently, c∗(k,A(m1,m2), θ)(s; eˆ, e)) is decreasing in e. There-
fore, implied investment decision satisfies the following:
γ(s, eˆ, e1) = y∗(k,m, θ; eˆ)− c∗(k,A(m1,m2), θ)(s; eˆ, e1))
≥ y∗(k,m, θ; eˆ)− c∗(k,A(m1,m2), θ)(s; eˆ, e2))
= γ(s, eˆ, e2)
Then, when e = eˆ and e1 ≥ e2, we have the operator A(m1,m2) is such that
γ(s, e) = y∗(k,m, θ; e)− A(m1,m2)(s; e, e) (3.39)
increasing in e.
Here is the definition of greatest recursive equilibrium investment when we use the
least consumption equilibrium:
Bg(s; e) = y
∗(s; e)− c∗(k,B(∧M2)(s; e), θ) (3.40)
Then, by the order continuity of B(m1) under Lemma 3.3.10 and continuity of
consumption under 3.3.4,
sup
n
Bng (s; e
1) = γ∗(s; e1)
= g∧(s; e1)
= (y∗ − c∗)(s; e1)
≥ (y∗ − c∗)(s; e2)
= g∧(s; e2)
= γ∗(s; e2)
Hence, the greatest recursive equilibrium investment is increasing in e while the be-
havior of consumption is indeterminate.
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(ii) By the argument in part (i),
Bng (s; e
1) = y∗(s; e1)− c∗(k,Bn(∧M2)(s; e1), θ)
≥ y∗(s; e2)− c∗(k,Bn(∧M2)(s; e2), θ)
= Bng (s; e
2)
By order continuity of A(m1,m2) in each argument,
sup
n
Bng (s; e
1) = sup
n
y∗(s; e1)− c∗(k,Bn(∧M2)(s; e1), θ)
= g∧(s; e1)
↘ g∧(s; e2)
= sup
n
y∗(s; e2)− c∗(k,Bn(∧M2)(s; e2), θ)
= sup
n
Bng (s; e
2)
Then, when the production externality rises, it effects both wage rates and rental
rates and overall effect depends on the dominance of these two channels. As it is seen
from the above Lemma, higher wages increase both consumption and investment
decisions of individuals. This is basically pure income effect which is to say that with
higher income, individuals both raise their consumption and their saving to smooth
that high level of consumption over the course of their life. On other hand, higher
rental rates make individuals more inclined to save more and consume less which
can be named as the price effect of higher externality. Overall, individuals prefer to
save more in response to higher production externality whereas their consumption
decisions is indeterminate due to two opposing forces mentioned above.
3.5 Conclusion
As a result, I extend the multi-step monotone mapping methodology to work
with models with elastic labor supply, nonseperable preferences and production ex-
102
ternalities. With this new extension, I succeed in proving the existence of recursive
equilibrium and producing comparative statics predictions on deep parameters of the
model.
To show the reader that the theory developed here is applicable to a wide range of
models which have been extensively used in the applied literature, in my next draft,
I plan to apply this methodology to some well-known models such as economies with
CRRA preferences or Cobb-Douglas production function. Hence, I can use Romer-
type economies with elastic labor supply and production externalities or Cass-Solow
growth model with regressive tax and lump-sum transfers.
3.6 Applications
3.6.1 Monopolistic Competition
Monopolistic competition model described by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) is a special
case of my economy.
The preferences of individuals are as follows:
u(c, l) =
[cv(l)](1−σ) − 1
1− σ
where σ > 0 but σ 6= 1. Moreover, v(l) is nonnegative, strictly increasing and concave.
In this model, there is an intermediate and final good sector. There is monopolistic
competition in intermediate good sector, whereas there is perfect competition in final
good sector.
There is a continuum of intermediate goods Y (i) where i ∈ [0, 1]. Production
technology for the final good is constant returns to scale:
Y =
 1∫
0
Y (i)λdi

1
λ
(3.41)
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where λ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, the final good producer solves the following maximization
problem:
Π = max
Y (i)
{Y −
1∫
0
P (i)Y (i)di}
Note that as the production technology is constant returns to scale, profits will
be zero. Fist order condition yields the following demand function for intermediate
goods:
Y (i) = P (i)
1
λ−1Y (3.42)
As the intermediate good sector is monopolistic, in the light of Benhabib and
Farmer (1994), I assume the following production function which displays increasing
returns to scale:
Y (i) = K(i)a+c ·N(i)b+d where a+ b+ c+ d > 1 (3.43)
Then the production function of the i’th intermediate good producer is:
Π(i) = P (i)Y (i)− wN(i)− rK(i)
Plugging P (i) from equation (3.42) yields the following:
Π(i) =
(
Y (i)
Y
)λ−1
Y (i)− wN(i)− rK(i)
Now the profit maximization problem for intermediate producer is as follows:
Π(i) = max
K(i),N(i)
Y 1−λN(i)λ(b+d)K(i)λ(a+c) − wN(i)− rK(i)
Note that the function will be concave as long as λ(a+ b+ c+ d) ≤ 1. First order
conditions give the following equations for prices:
λ(a+ c)
Y (i)P (i)
K(i)
= r
λ(b+ d)
Y (i)P (i)
N(i)
= w
104
To make it similar to the economy described here, I assume symmery among
intermediate goods which leads the following:
N(i) = N , K(i) = K, P (i) = P¯
As final good sector is competitive, I know:
Π = Y −
1∫
0
P¯ Y (i)di = 0 (3.44)
This implies P¯ = P (i) = 1. Now, with the symmetry assumption, the aggregate
final good function is
Y = Ka+cN b+d (3.45)
To make it similar to the production technology described in this paper, we can
define the aggregate output technology as
Y = kanbKcNd (3.46)
where KcNd = e(K,N) displays the production externality which is defined in
detail at section 3.2. Moreover, kanb = f(k, n) stands for the individual production
technology of each firm. Equation (3.46) is similar to equation (3.45) as in equilibrium
k = K and n = N . For simplicity, assume that there is no production shock θ.
Lastly, if we add up factor payments and profits of the intermediate sector, it
will add up to total output. This is also in line with my definition of income in the
original model.
1∫
0
[Π(i) + wN(i) + rK(i)]di = Π + wN + rK
= Y 1−λ
1∫
0
N(i)λ(b+d)K(i)λ(a+c)
= Y
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If b+ d < 1, the wage rate is decreasing in N in equilibrium. This is in line with
assumption 3(i) which is the small externality case. In this case, there exists a unique
and continuous l∗1(K,C) as stated in Lemma 3.3.1(i).
On the other hand, if b+ d > 1, the wage rate is increasing in N as in assumption
3(ii). In this case, there is multiplicity as pointed out by Lemma 3.3.1(iii).
To construct the fixed point decomposition for recursive equilibrium on minimal
state space (e.i. K = k), take m1(k) ∈ M1(k) and m2(k) ∈ M2(k) and define the
following mapping using the household’s Euler equation:
Z(x, k,K,m1,m2,m3) =
1
x
− β 1
m1(g(k, x))
ag(k,m3)
a−1n(g(K,m2),m1(g(K,m3)))b
· g(K,m2)cN(g(K,m2),m1(g(K,m3)))
By Lemma 3.3.8, Z is decreasing in x and m3 and increasing in k, m1, m2.
Impose x = m3 pointwise and define x
∗ = x∗(k,K,m1,m2) such that
Z(x∗, k,K,m1,m2) = 0
Now, define the following operator:
A(m1,m2)(k,K, θ) = x
∗(k,K, θ,m1,m2) for k = K > 0 and 0 < m1 ≤ u−11
= 0 else
Under Lemma 3.3.9 and Lemma 3.3.10, A is order continuous increasing fixed
point decomposition.
Under Theorem 3.3.1, there exists multiple recursive competitive investments
g∗(k, k). Further, the least and greatest investment decisions are increasing under
minimal state space.
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Under Theorem 3.4.1, higher discount rates causes the least and greatest consump-
tion choices to decrease and the least and greatest investment choices to increase.
Under Theorem 3.4.2, higher production externality causes the least and greatest
saving decision to rise.
3.6.2 Santos Economy
My model can also generalize Santos (2002) Economy, with elastic labor supply
and decreasing tax rate on capital returns.
Consider a Cass-Solow growth model with regressive taxation on capital returns
and elastic labor supply. There are continuum of households and they get utility
from consumption and leisure. Households are endowed with 1 unit of time each
period. They decide their consumption and how much time to allocate on leisure.
They receive labor income and capital returns as well as profits as they own the firms.
Their income are taxed and they also received lump-sum transfers.
Hence, the period utility function for each household is as follows:
u(c, l) =
[c · v(l)]1−σ − 1
1− σ
where v(l) is strictly increasing and concave function and σ 6= 1 and σ > 0.
The budget constraint is as follows:
c+ k′ = [w(K,N,K,N)(1− l) + r(K,N,K,N)k + Π(K,N)](1− τ(K)) + T (K)
Assumption: τ : K → [0, 1) is decreasing and T (K) = τ(K) · y is the lump-sum
transfers.
Lastly, we have the usual capital evolution process where I assume depreciation
rate is 1 for simplicity.
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Given this information, the side conditions are as follows:
u2(c, l)
u1(c, l)
= 1
m
w(K,N,K,N)(1− τ(K))
u1(c, l) =
1
m
The firms in this economy has the following technology:
F (k, n,K,N) = f(k, n)e(K,N) = kanbKcNd
where a+ b = 1.
Market clearing prices as a result of profit maximization is as follows:
r(K,N,K,N) = aKa+b−1N c+d
w(K,N,K,N) = bKa+bN b+d−1
To make this model similar to the model introduced in this paper (e.i. one sector
growth model with production externality and no taxes), I should define the produc-
tion externality as follows:
e′(K,N) = KcNd(1− τ(K))
Hence, the new production function F ′(k, n,K,N) = F (k, n,K,N) · (1− τ(K))
This leads new price levels would be:
r′(K,N,K,N) = a(1− τ(K))Ka+b−1N c+d
w′(K,N,K,N) = b(1− τ(K))Ka+bN b+d−1
New profit function:
Π′(K,N) = F ′(k, n,K,N)− r′(K,N,K,N)K − w′(K,N,K,N)N
= Π(K,N)(1− τ(K))
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Lastly, the individual income is as follows:
y′(K,N,K,N) = r′(K,N,K,N)K + w′(K,N,K,N)N + Π′(K,N)
= r(K,N,K,N)K(1− τ(K)) + w(K,N,K,N)N(1− τ(K))
+ Π(K,N)(1− τ(K))
= y(1− τ(K))
To construct the fixed point decomposition for recursive equilibrium on minimal
state space (e.i. K=k), take m1(k) ∈ M1(k) and m2(k) ∈ M2(k) and define the
following mapping using the household’s Euler equation:
Z(x, k,K,m1,m2) =
1
x
− β 1
m1(g(k, x))
ag(k,m3)
a−1n(g(K,m2),m1(g(K,m3)))b
· g(K,m2)cN(g(K,m2),m1(g(K,m3)))(1− τ(g(K,m2)))
By Lemma 3.3.8, Z is decreasing in x and m3 and increasing in k, m1, m2.
Impose x = m3 pointwise and define x
∗ = x∗(k,K,m1,m2) such that
Z(x∗, k,K,m1,m2) = 0
Now, define the following operator:
A(m1,m2)(k,K, θ) = x
∗(k,K, θ,m1,m2) for k = K > 0 and 0 < m1 ≤ u−11
= 0 else
Under Lemma 3.3.9 and Lemma 3.3.10, A is order continuous increasing fixed
point decomposition.
Under Theorem 3.3.1, there exists multiple recursive competitive investments
g∗(k, k). Further, the least and greatest investment decisions are increasing under
minimal state space.
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Under Theorem 3.4.1, higher discount rates causes the least and greatest consump-
tion choices to decrease and the least and greatest investment choices to increase.
Under Theorem 3.4.2, higher production externality causes the least and greatest
saving decision to rise.
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max
{{Hgj ,Hˆgj ,}{g,j}}
(µln(C) + (1− µ)ln(L)) (A.1)
subject to C =
[∑
j∈J
jCθj
] 1
θ
(A.2)
L = (ξlL
ηl
f˜
+ (1− ξl)Lηlm˜)
1
ηl (A.3)
Cj = [ψjc

j + (1− ψj)cˆj]
1
 ∀j ∈ J (A.4)
cj = AjHj ∀j ∈ J (A.5)
cˆj = AˆjHˆj ∀j ∈ J (A.6)
Hj = [ξjH
η
f˜j
+ (1− ξj)Hηf˜j]
1
η (A.7)
cˆj = AˆjHˆj ∀j ∈ J (A.8)
Hˆj = [ξjHˆ
η
f˜j
+ (1− ξj)Hˆηf˜j]
1
η (A.9)
H¯g = Hgj + Hˆgj + Lg ∀g ∈ G (A.10)
To solve this problem, we first optimize across home and market. Then, we will
optimize across different types of composite goods.
Step 1: Optimize across home and market
Let Ngj be the optimal labor allocation of gender g in sector j. Hence,
Ngj = Hgj + Hˆgj ∀j, g (A.11)
This is basically maximizing Cjt for a given j subject to production functions and
time constraints.
Now, we will maximize (A.4) subject to (A.11) and the production functions (A.7)
and (A.9). This optimization gives us individual labor supply choices as a function
of Nf˜ j and Nm˜j.
max
{Hgj ,Hˆgj}g∈f˜ ,m˜
[ψjc

j + (1− ψj)cˆj]
1
 (A.12)
subject to cj = Aj[ξjH
η
f˜j
+ (1− ξj)Hηm˜j]
1
η (A.13)
cˆj = Aˆj[ξˆjHˆ
η
f˜j
+ (1− ξˆj)Hˆηm˜j]
1
η (A.14)
Nf˜ j = Hf˜ j + Hˆf˜ j (A.15)
Nm˜j = Hm˜j + Hˆm˜j (A.16)
First order conditions yields the following important condition about the market
and home allocation in sector j:
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αj
Hf˜ j
Hm˜j
η−1
= αˆj
Hˆf˜ j
Hˆm˜j
η−1
= x (A.17)
where x is ratio of lagrange multipliers. It is also equal to gender wage ratio
wf
wm
in
decentralized economy. This is the condition for the assumption of free labor mobility
between home and market sector.
Together with the time constraints, equation (A.17) gives us a relationship be-
tween Hf˜ j and Hm˜j but as the first order conditions are nonlinear, I could not obtain
optimal levels exactly. Here is the relationship:
Hf˜ j =
Nf˜ jHm˜j
zjNm˜j + (1− za)Hm˜j (A.18)
where zj = (
αj
αˆ j
)
1
1−η
A.0.1 CASE 1: ξj = ξˆj
Economically speaking, this means women do not have any comparative advantage
between market and home but they do so between different industries. With this
assumption, equation (A.18 gives:
Hm˜j = Hf˜ j
Nm˜j
Nf˜ j
(A.19)
Combining this with the first order conditions (foc) of Step 1’s optimization prob-
lem (i.e. Ratio of the foc of Hf˜ j to Hˆf˜ j) yields:
Hf˜ j =
Nf˜ j
1 +Bj
(A.20)
Hm˜j =
Nm˜j
1 +Bj
(A.21)
Hˆf˜ j =
Nf˜ jBj
1 +Bj
(A.22)
Hˆm˜jt =
Nm˜jBj
1 +Bj
(A.23)
where Bj = { ψj1−ψj
(
Aj
Aˆj
)
} 1−1 .
Given these solutions, we can redefine the following variables in terms of Nf˜ j and
Nm˜j as they will be necessary in the next step:
cj = Aj
1
1 +Bj
Nj (A.24)
cˆj = Aˆj
Bj
1 +Bj
Nj (A.25)
Cj = EjNj (A.26)
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where
Nj = [ξjN
η
f˜j
+ (1− ξj)Nηm˜j]
1
η (A.27)
and Ej =
[
ψjA

j
(
1
1+Bj
)
+ (1− ψj)Aˆj
(
Bj
1+Bj
)] 1
.
Given this, we move onto the second step where we will find the optimal levels of
Nf˜ j and Nm˜j.
Step 2: Optimizing across different sectors
max
{Ngj}g,j
(µln(C) + (1− µ)ln(L)) (A.28)
subject to C =
[∑
j∈J
κjC
θ
j
] 1
θ
(A.29)
L = (ξlL
ηl
f + (1− ξl)Lηlm)
1
ηl (A.30)
Cj = EjNj ∀j (A.31)
H¯g =
∑
j
Ngj + Lg ∀g ∈ f˜ , m˜ (A.32)
Here are the first order conditions:
foc(Nf˜ j) : µκjE
θ
j ξj
1
Cθ
(Nj)
θ−ηNη−1
f˜ j
= (1− µ)ξl 1
Lηl
Lηl−1
f˜
(A.33)
foc(Nm˜j) : µκjE
θ
j (1− ξj)
1
Cθ
(Nj)
θ−ηNη−1m˜j = (1− µ)(1− ξl)
1
Lηl
Lηl−1m˜
First order conditions for Nf˜ j and Nm˜j yield the following useful equation:
αj
(
Nf˜ j
Nm˜j
)η−1
= αl
(
Lf˜
Lm˜
)ηl−1
(A.34)
where αj =
ξj
1−ξj and αl =
ξl
1−ξl . In the decentralized economy, this ratio is equal to
the gender wage ratio x =
wf˜
wm˜
.
From first order conditions of Nf˜ j and Nf˜k, we get the following:
Nj
Nk
=
(
Nf˜ j
Nfk
) η−1
η−θ
(
κjE
θ
j ξj
κkEθkξk
) 1
η−θ
(A.35)
So, although we could not derive explicit solutions for Nf˜ j and Nf˜ j, we can still
derive and explicit solution for labor force participation which is the main variable of
interest.
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Recall Nj from (A.27). Taking the ratios
Nj
Nk
provides the following equation:
Nf˜ j
Nfk
=
(
F (x, k)
F (x, j)
ξk
ξj
) 1
η
(
Nj
Nk
)
(A.36)
where F (x, k) = 1 + α
1
η−1
j x
η
1−η .
Combining equations (A.35) and (A.36) give labor supply allocation of women
across sectors:
Nf˜ j
Nfk
=
Gf˜ (x, j)
Gf˜ (x, k)
(A.37)
where Gf (x, j) =
(
ξ
θ
η
j (κjE
θ
j )F (x, j)
θ
η
−1
) 1
1−θ
.
Define
N¯f˜ j =
∑
j
Nf˜ j (A.38)
.
The equation (A.33) also yields a relationship between leisure and work given
equations (A.37), (A.38) and (A.31).
Nf˜ j
Lf˜
=
µ
1− µκjE
θ
j
N θj
Cθ
F (x, l)
F (x, j)
(A.39)
When we some over the sectors j, equation (A.39) comes down to following:∑
j Nf˜ j
Lf˜
=
µ
1− µF (x, l)
∑
j
κj
F (x.j)
(A.40)
Labor force participation is defines as follows:
lfpf˜ =
∑
j Hf˜ j
H¯f˜
(A.41)
=
∑
j
Hf˜ j
Nf˜ j
Nf˜ j
H¯f˜
=
∑
j
Hf˜ j
Nf˜ j
Nf˜ j
N¯f˜ j + Lf˜
=
∑
j
Hf˜ j
Nf˜ j
(
N¯f˜ j
Nf˜ j
+
Lf˜
Nf˜ j
)−1
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max
{{Hgjt,Hˆgjt,Kt+1}{g,j}}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt(µln(Ct) + (1− µ)ln(Lt)) (B.1)
subject to Ct =
[∑
j∈J
jCθjt
] 1
θ
(B.2)
Lt = (ξlL
ηl
ft + (1− ξl)Lηlmt)
1
ηl (B.3)
Cjt = [ψjc

jt + (1− ψj)cˆjt]
1
 ∀j ∈ J (B.4)
cjt = AjtH
1−α
jt ∀j ∈ J {m} (B.5)
cmt = AmtK
α
t H
1−α
mt −Kt+1 (B.6)
cˆjt = AˆjtHˆjt ∀j ∈ J (B.7)
H¯gt = Hgjt + Hˆgjt + Lgt ∀g ∈ G (B.8)
To solve this problem, we first optimize across home and market. Then, we will
optimize across different types of composite goods.
Step 1: Optimize across home and market
Let Ngjt be the optimal labor allocation of gender g in sector j. Hence,
Ngjt = Hgjt + Hˆgjt ∀j, g, t (B.9)
This is basically maximizing Cjt for a given j subject to production functions and
time constraints.
Now, we will maximize (B.4) subject to (B.9) and the production functions (B.5)
and (B.7) given the definition of labor aggregators at equations (2.9) and (2.2). This
optimization gives us individual labor supply choices as a function of Nf˜ jt and Nm˜jt
for j ∈ J {m}.
max
{Hgjt,Hˆgjt}g∈f˜ ,m˜
[ψjc

jt + (1− ψj)cˆjt]
1
 (B.10)
subject to cjt = AjtHjt (B.11)
cˆjt = AˆjtHˆjt (B.12)
Nf˜ jt = Hf˜ jt + Hˆf˜ jt (B.13)
Nm˜jt = Hm˜jt + Hˆm˜jt (B.14)
For j = m, the problem would be as follows:
max
{Hgmt,}g∈f˜ ,m˜
cmt (B.15)
subject to cmt = AmtK
1−α
mt H
1−α
mt (B.16)
Nf˜ jt = Hf˜ jt + Hˆf˜ jt (B.17)
Nm˜jt = Hm˜jt + Hˆm˜jt (B.18)
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First order conditions yields two important conditions about the market and home
allocation in sector j:
α
1
1−η
j
Hf˜ jt
Hm˜jt
= αˆ
1
1−η
j
Hˆf˜ jt
Hˆm˜jt
= x (B.19)
where x is ratio of lagrange multipliers. It is also equal to gender wage ratio
wf˜
wm˜
in
decentralized economy. This is the condition for the assumption of free labor mobility
between home and market sector.
Together with the time constraints, equation (B.19) gives us a relationship between
Hfjt and Hmjt but as the first order conditions are nonlinear, I could not obtain
optimal levels exactly. Here is the relationship:
Hf˜ jt =
Nf˜ jtHm˜jt
zjNm˜jt + (1− za)Hm˜jt (B.20)
where zj = (
αj
αˆ j
)
1
1−η
Step 2: After obtaining the individual labor supply choices as a function of Nf˜ jt
and Nm˜jt, we will now maximize utility function to find optimal Nf˜ jt and Nm˜jt as
well as capital and leisure choices given production functions and time constraints.
max
{{Ngjt,Kt+1}{g,j}}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
βt(µln(Ct) + (1− µ)ln(Lt)) (B.21)
subject to Ct =
[∑
j∈J
jCθjt
] 1
θ
(B.22)
Lt = (ξlL
ηl
ft + (1− ξl)Lηlmt)
1
ηl (B.23)
Cjt = [ψjc

jt + (1− ψj)cˆjt]
1
 ∀j ∈ J (B.24)
cjt = AjtH(Nf˜ jt, Nm˜jt)
1−α
jt ∀j/J {m} (B.25)
cmt = AmtK
α
t H
1−α
mt −Kt+1 (B.26)
cˆjt = AˆjtHˆ(Nf˜ jt, Nm˜jt)jt ∀j ∈ J (B.27)
H¯gt = Ngjt + Lgt ∀g ∈ G (B.28)
B.0.1 CASE 1: ξj = ξˆj
Economically speaking, this means women do not have any comparative advantage
between market and home but they do so between different industries. With this
assumption, equation (B.20 gives:
Hm˜jt = Hf˜ jt
Nm˜jt
Nf˜ jt
(B.29)
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Combining this with first order conditions of Step 1’s optimization problem yields:
Hf˜ jt =
Nf˜ jt
1 +B
(B.30)
Hm˜jt =
Nm˜jt
1 +B
(B.31)
Hˆf˜ jt =
Nf˜ jtB
1 +B
(B.32)
Hˆmjt =
Nm˜jtB
1 +B
(B.33)
where B =
(
(1− α) ψj
1−ψj
(
Ajt
Aˆjt
)) 1(1−α)−1
Now that we have obtained these results, I can maximize the utility function as in
Step 2. For that, I will first derive composite consumption as functions of Nf˜ jt and
Nm˜jt
∀j 6= m : Cjt = EjtNjt (B.34)
where Ejt =
[
ψj
(
Ajt
1+B
)
+ (1− ψj)
(
BAˆjt
1+B
)] 1
and
Njt =
[
ξjN
η
f˜jt
+ (1− ξj)Nηf˜jt
] 1
η
(B.35)
j = m : Cmt = EmtK
α
t N
1−α
mt −Kt+1 (B.36)
where Emt =
Amt
1+B
Also, time constraints will become:
H¯f˜ t = Nf˜at +Hf˜mt +Nf˜st + Lf˜ t (B.37)
H¯m˜t = Nm˜at +Hm˜mt +Nm˜st + Lm˜t (B.38)
Now, maximize Utility function B.1 subject to (B.3), (B.34), (B.36) and time
constraints.
Euler equation will be as follows:
Cθ−1mt
Cθt
= β
Cθ−1mt+1
Cθt+1
αEmt+1K
α−1
t+1 N
1−α
mt (B.39)
And here are the firs order conditions for female workers:
foc(Nfjt)∀j 6= m : µjEθjtξj
1
Cθt
N θ−ηjt N
η−1
f˜ jt
= (1− µ)ξl
Lηl−1ft
Lηt
foc(Nfmt) for j = m : µmξj
1
Cθt
Cθ−1mt DmtK
α
mtN
1−α−η
mt N
η−1
f˜mt
= (1− µ)ξl
Lηl−1ft
Lηt
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K
Nm
= (βαEm)
1
1−α (B.40)
Recall equation (B.35) for both sector j 6= m and sector m. That gives us the
following useful equation:
(
Nj
Nm
)η
=
ξj
(
1 + x
η
1−ηα
1
1−η
j
)
ξm
(
1 + x
η
1−ηα
1
1−η
m
) ( Nfj
Nfm
)η
(B.41)
where x =
wf˜
wm˜
and αj =
ξj
1−ξj in the decentralized economy.
Denote F (x, j) = ξj
(
1 + x
η
1−ηα
1
1−η
j
)
∀j ∈ J
Using first order conditions together with equation (B.41) give us the following:
Nf˜ j
Nf˜m
=
 j
m
ξj
ξm
Eθj
(βα)
α+θ−1
1−α E
θ
1−α
m (E2−αm − 1)θ−1
(
F (x, j)
F (x,m)
) θ−η
η
 11−θ = G(x, j)
G(x,m)
(B.42)
Now, given this result and time constraint for female workers, I can actually
calculate the main variable interest of this paper: labor force participation.
N¯f˜ =
∑
j
Nf˜ j (B.43)
lfpf˜ =
∑
j
Hf˜ j
Nf˜ j
=
∑
j
Hf˜ j
Nf˜ j
Nf˜ j
N¯f
(B.44)
Using (B.30) and (B.42) and (B.43) yields the following:
lfpf˜ =
∑
j
1
1 +Bj
G(x, j)∑
j G(x, j)
(B.45)
is the labor force participation rate for women which is the variable of interest of this
paper. In the main text of the paper, I will write my comments on this variable.
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